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MARIJUANA, STATE 
EXTRATERRITORIALITY, AND CONGRESS 
MARK D. ROSEN* 
Abstract: The Trump administration inherits the Obama administration’s pol-
icy of under-enforcing federal marijuana laws and a nation with a patchwork 
of divergent state laws. Although allowing diversity and experimentation, 
such divergence may impose spillover costs to some states. Some states may 
attempt to address these costs by exercising extraterritorial regulatory powers 
on their citizens. Although it is unclear and a matter of dispute whether and to 
what extent states have such extraterritorial authority, this Article shows that it 
is certain that Congress has power to set the bounds of state extraterritorial 
regulation, subject to only limited constitutional restraints. The Article then 
explores several surprising implications of this congressional power. It argues 
that although Congress would set state extraterritorial powers by means of 
legislation, most of the considerations informing that legislation would belong 
to the constitutional domain, not the domain of mere politics. Relying on an-
other work by the author that argues that Congress ought to be governed by 
Special Norms when it engages in constitutional decisionmaking, this Article 
shows how such Special Norms would operate in relation to Congress’s de-
termination of state extraterritorial powers  
INTRODUCTION 
Although federal law prohibits the possession, sale, and transportation 
of marijuana,1 the Obama administration signaled that it would tolerate ma-
rijuana in states that legalized its use. Since then, the number of states that 
permit marijuana has steadily increased, though substantial swaths of the 
country still do not. In the aftermath of the 2016 election, more than half the 
states allow marijuana for medical purposes, and seven states (along with 
the District of Columbia) also permit its recreational use.2 
                                                                                                                           
 © 2017, Mark D. Rosen. All rights reserved. 
 * University Distinguished Professor, IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law (mrosen1@kentlaw.
iit.edu). 
 1 See Comprehensive Drug Abuse, Prevention and Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-513, 
84 Stat. 1236, 1248 (1970) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. §§ 801–971). Marijuana is classified 
as a Schedule I drug. 21 U.S.C. § 812 (2012). 
 2 See Christopher Ingraham, Marijuana Wins Big on Election Night, WASH. POST (Nov. 8, 
2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2016/11/08/medical-marijuana-sails-to-
victory-in-florida/ [https://perma.cc/GR43-6MX3]; John Wagner & Matt Zapotosky, Spicer: Feds 
Could Step up Enforcement Against Marijuana Use in States, WASH. POST (Feb. 23, 2017), https://
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If the Trump administration continues the Obama administration’s un-
der-enforcement of the federal marijuana laws,3 the United States will con-
tinue to be governed by a patchwork of divergent state laws. Such diversity 
across states can provide two benefits well-rehearsed in federalism scholar-
ship, namely experimentation and diversity. As to the first, states can exper-
iment with different regulatory approaches. This is particularly useful where 
there are empirical uncertainties, such as whether marijuana itself is dan-
gerous, and whether marijuana is a gateway to other more dangerous drugs. 
Diversity, the second potential benefit, is frequently conflated with ex-
perimentation, but is independent of it. Whereas experimentation typically 
presumes a future convergence when data reveals the objectively superior 
policy, diversity anticipates enduring policy divergences that reflect durable 
differences in political sensibilities across states. There’s no reason to think 
that Utah and Idaho’s social conservatism will (or should) shift, any more 
than we should expect (or hope) that California and Oregon will shed their 
social progressivism. And lasting regulatory diversity across states can be a 
normative good. It gives people with different views the option of living in 
a place that fits their preferences. Regulatory diversity as to divisive social 
issues also may operate as a pressure valve that helps maintain the social 
cohesion necessary to preserve a federal union among our country’s im-
mense and heterogeneous population. 
A patchwork of divergent state marijuana laws also can create costs, 
however, including spillover effects.4 For example, a state’s law prohibiting 
marijuana to guard against impaired driving and addiction can be thwarted 
if its citizens can simply cross the border and smoke in a neighboring state 
                                                                                                                           
www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-politics/wp/2017/02/23/spicer-feds-could-step-up-anti-pot-
enforcement-in-states-where-recreational-marijuana-is-legal/ [https://perma.cc/B57R-VDMA]. 
 3 Though Attorney General Jeff Sessions has been a longtime critic of marijuana, his testimony 
during confirmation hearings left it uncertain what precisely he will do once in office. See Tom Hud-
dleston, Jr., What Jeff Sessions Said About Marijuana in His Attorney General Hearing, FORTUNE 
(Jan. 10, 2017), http://fortune.com/2017/01/10/jeff-sessions-marijuana-confirmation-hearing/ 
[https://perma.cc/Q4NZ-A9VM] (noting that Attorney General Sessions said that he “won't com-
mit to never enforcing federal law” when asked about possible federal involvement in state mari-
juana markets). Regardless of what happens during the Trump Administration, a future admin-
istration might revive the Obama Administration’s approach in the event Congress does not 
amend federal law. States may also attempt to challenge other state efforts to decriminalize mari-
juana. See Chad DeVeaux & Anne Mostad-Jensen, Fear and Loathing in Colorado: Invoking the 
Supreme Court's State-Controversy Jurisdiction to Challenge the Marijuana-Legalization Exper-
iment, 56 B.C. L. REV. 1829, 1881–96 (2015). 
 4 A multiplicity of divergent laws also makes it more difficult, and hence costly, for citizens 
to know the applicable law. Divergent regulatory approaches can also lead to genuine legal uncer-
tainty, as when a single transaction or occurrence straddles two states with meaningfully different 
laws. 
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that permits recreational marijuana use.5 In the other direction, a neighbor-
ing state’s more restrictive laws can reduce the value of the benefits a regu-
latorily permissive state hopes to provide its citizens.6 Such spillover effects 
can undercut federalism’s benefits of experimentation and diversity, insofar 
as they reduce the efficacy of each state’s distinctive laws. 
States can avoid many of their sister states’ spillover effects, and 
thereby bolster the efficacy of their own law, by extending the reach of their 
law beyond their state’s border.7 For example, a socially conservative state 
concerned with impaired driving and addiction might consider prohibiting 
its citizens from using marijuana even when they are in a state that permits 
recreational use. Effective enforcement might require that a state aim to ap-
ply its laws to the purveyor of the marijuana, even if it be a non-citizen act-
ing in another state. 
Whether states have such extraterritorial regulatory powers is a com-
plex doctrinal question that has been the subject of substantial scholarly 
debate.8 The extent of a state’s extraterritorial powers is not governed by a 
single constitutional provision, but turns on multiple complicated doctrines, 
including due process, the Dormant Commerce Clause, Article IV’s Privi-
leges and Immunities Clause, and the right to travel.9 
In a series of earlier articles I argued that as a matter of positive law, 
states presently have substantial powers to extraterritorially regulate their 
citizens, and some (though less) power to extraterritorially regulate non-
citizens.10 These extraterritorial regulatory powers are only presumptive, 
                                                                                                                           
 5 See generally Mark D. Rosen, Extraterritoriality and Political Heterogeneity in American 
Federalism, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 855 (2002) (discussing the possibility of “travel-evasion”). 
 6 In the context of gun rights, this fuels calls for Reciprocal Concealed Carry laws. See infra 
notes 165–166 and accompanying text. 
 7 Doing so would not eliminate spillover effects, but redistribute them by shifting some of 
them to a sister state. 
 8 Important contributions include Katherine Florey, State Courts, State Territory, State Pow-
er: Reflections on the Extraterritoriality Principle in Choice of Law and Legislation, 84 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 1057, 1064–67 (2009); Seth F. Kreimer, The Law of Choice and Choice of Law: 
Abortion, the Right to Travel, and Extraterritorial Regulation in American Federalism, 67 N.Y.U. 
L. REV. 451, 487–519 (1992); Seth F. Kreimer, “But Whoever Treasures Freedom . . .”: The 
Right to Travel and Extraterritorial Abortions, 91 MICH. L. REV. 907, 913–17 (1993); Donald H. 
Regan, Siamese Essays: (1) CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America and Dormant Commerce 
Clause Doctrine; (II) Extraterritorial State Legislation, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1865, 1885 (1987). 
 9 The Sixth Amendment is also implicated for criminal matters, though this Article does not 
address it because it focuses on civil regulation. As explained below, the scope of states’ extrater-
ritorial powers also implicates the Fourteenth Amendment’s Citizenship Clause. See supra notes 
90–103 and accompanying text. 
 10 See Rosen, supra note 5, at 911–13; Mark D. Rosen, “Hard” or “Soft” Pluralism?: Posi-
tive, Normative, and Institutional Considerations of States’ Extraterritorial Powers, 51 ST. LOUIS 
U. L.J. 713, 744–50 (2007) [hereinafter Rosen, Hard or Soft Pluralism?]; Mark D. Rosen, State 
Extraterritorial Powers Reconsidered, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1133, 1143–55 (2010) [hereinaf-
 
1016 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 58:1013 
however, insofar as they may be modified by Congress.11 Subject to only 
limited constitutional constraints, Congress has the final word in determin-
ing the states’ extraterritorial regulatory powers.12 
This Article explores several facets of, and implications concerning, 
Congress’s power to determine the bounds of state extraterritorial powers. 
Part I makes clear that most of the extraterritoriality restrictions that to date 
have attracted scholarly and judicial attention constrain states, but not Con-
gress.13 Part I then identifies the several sources of Congress’s power to de-
termine states’ extraterritorial powers, and explains the constitutional limita-
tions to which those powers are subject.14 In so doing, this Article also aims 
to make a contribution to our understanding of the right to travel. 
Part II argues that although Congress would set state extraterritorial 
powers by means of legislation, most of the considerations that would in-
form that legislation belong to the constitutional domain, not the domain of 
ordinary politics.15 This is because legislation determining states’ extraterri-
torial powers would play a substantial role in building out our nation’s sys-
tem of horizontal federalism, by determining the extent to which states can 
efficaciously pursue divergent policies in fields as to which federal law does 
not demand a uniform nationwide approach. To elaborate, a state frequently 
will be unable to accomplish a constitutionally permissible policy goal if 
her citizens can free themselves of their home state’s regulation simply by 
entering another state. If the home state cannot apply its law to its traveling 
citizen so as to preclude “travel-evasion” of a constitutionally permissible 
policy, then the range of policy options open to the states in our federal un-
ion will be limited as a practical matter. Such a federal regime – one where 
it will be difficult for a state to have efficacious regulations that are stricter 
than what is allowed by more permissive states – is what elsewhere I have 
dubbed Soft Pluralism.16 A federal regime of Hard Pluralism, by contrast, 
would allow states to extraterritorially regulate so as to counteract travel-
evasion, thereby allowing states to efficaciously regulate wherever federal 
law does not require nationwide uniformity.17 In deciding between Hard and 
                                                                                                                           
ter Rosen, State Extraterritorial Powers Reconsidered]; see also Mark D. Rosen, Choice-of-Law 
as Non-Constitutional Federal Law, 99 MINN. L. REV. 1017, 1058–64 (2015) [hereinafter Rosen, 
Choice-of-Law]; Mark D. Rosen, Congress’s Primary Role in Determining What Full Faith and 
Credit Requires: An Additional Argument, 41 CAL. W. INT’L L. J. 7, 21 (2011).  
 11 Rosen, State Extraterritorial Powers Reconsidered, supra note 10, at 1142–43. 
 12 Id. at 1151–52. 
 13 See infra notes 27–39 and accompanying text. 
 14 See infra notes 40–104 and accompanying text. 
 15 See infra notes 105–120 and accompanying text. 
 16 See Rosen, Hard or Soft Pluralism?, supra note 10, at 715–16. 
 17 See id. at 716. 
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Soft Pluralism, federal legislation setting the bounds of state extraterritorial 
powers would determine the very nature of our federal union, and of what is 
entailed by national and state citizenship. Deciding between Hard and Soft 
Pluralism accordingly belongs to the domain of constitutional decisionmak-
ing, not the domain of ordinary politics. 
Pivoting from description to prescription, Part III argues that Part II’s 
lesson that congressional determinations of state extraterritorial powers are 
substantially informed by constitutional considerations should affect the 
way Congress acts.18 Part III draws on a work-in-progress of mine that 
claims Congress ought to be governed by Special Norms when it engages in 
constitutional decisionmaking, in contradistinction to the virtually no-holds-
barred norms of Hardball Politics that are permissible in ordinary politics.19 
The Special Norms include the norm of Proactivity, which imposes a duty 
for Congress to act in certain circumstances,20 and the norm of Explicitness, 
which presumptively requires Congress to explicitly consider constitutional 
issues when they arise.21 Finally, Congress’s constitutional decisionmaking 
should be governed by the norm of Tempered Politics, rather than Hardball 
Politics. Tempered Politics encompasses a cluster of attitudinal, behavioral, 
and substantive guidelines that encourage persuasion and compromise in 
service of finding consensus, in contrast to the brute majoritarianism that is 
permissible under the norms of Hardball Politics.22 
In short, the Special Norms structure Congress’s constitutional deci-
sionmaking in a manner designed to generate responsible, Constitution-
worthy action. The Special Norms aim to harness Congress’s unique institu-
tional capacities that account for the value Congress can, and should, add to 
the multi-institutional process by which our polity renders its constitutional 
judgments. Although the Special Norms do not dictate a unique answer re-
                                                                                                                           
 18 See infra notes 121–204 and accompanying text. By contrast, the scholar who has done the 
most work identifying Congress’s extensive powers to structure interstate relations has assumed 
that Congress’s decisionmaking in this realm would be no different from how Congress operates 
when deciding mill run political questions. See Gillian E. Metzger, Congress, Article IV, and In-
terstate Relations, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1468, 1484 (2007) (writing that Congress would not be 
“‘disinterested’ in some platonic sense” when deciding interstate matters, but that “members of 
Congress can be expected to advance their own policy preferences or those of particular interest 
groups—businesses and residents in their states, perhaps, or powerful national enterprises and 
associations”). 
 19 See Mark D. Rosen, The Special Norms Thesis: Why Congress’ Constitutional Deci-
sionmaking Should be Disciplined by More than the Usual Norms of Politics 32–55 (unpublished 
manuscript) (on file with author) [hereinafter Rosen, Special Norms Thesis]. 
 20 Id. at 57–58. 
 21 Id. at 58–63. 
 22 Id. at 63–77. 
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garding state extraterritorial powers, they eliminate some options that other-
wise would be available under Hardball Politics. 
I. DISENTANGLING CONGRESS AND THE STATES 
It is unsurprising that the extensive scholarly literature considering 
state extraterritoriality has undertaken its analysis almost exclusively from 
the vantage point of state governments, examining what states can (and 
cannot) presently do extraterritorially.23 Yet that perspective is incomplete, 
because Congress has substantial powers to determine whether and to what 
extent states can act extraterritorially. 
This Part clarifies Congress’s prerogative to set state extraterritorial 
powers. Section A identifies the several restrictions that constrain states but 
not Congress.24 Section B then locates the constitutional provisions that 
give Congress power to determine states’ extraterritorial powers.25 Section 
C explores constitutional limits to which Congress’s powers are subject.26 
A. Constraints That Limit States, but Not Congress 
The ‘constitutional’ restriction on state extraterritoriality that has re-
ceived the most attention from courts and scholars is the Dormant Com-
merce Clause.27 It no doubt owes its prominence to the several Supreme 
Court cases that have explicitly discussed the issue of extraterritoriality and 
laid down an apparently clear, categorical prohibition against such state 
powers.28 In one frequently cited case, for instance, the Court flatly stated 
that “the ‘Commerce Clause . . . precludes the application of a state statute 
to commerce that takes place wholly outside of the State’s borders, whether 
                                                                                                                           
 23 See supra note 8 (citing several articles regarding states’ extraterritorial regulatory powers). 
 24 See infra notes 27–39 and accompanying text. 
 25 See infra notes 40–61 and accompanying text. 
 26 See infra notes 62–104 and accompanying text. 
 27 Courts and scholars typically refer to the Dormant Commerce Clause as providing a “con-
stitutional” limitation on states. See, e.g., Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 172–73 (1941) 
(finding a state law to be an “unconstitutional barrier to interstate commerce” under the Dormant 
Commerce Clause). Dormant Commerce Clause restrictions, however, are better understood as a 
form of federal common law, insofar as they are judicially created in areas of unexercised Com-
merce Clause power that accordingly can be legislatively overridden by Congress. See Rosen, 
Hard or Soft Pluralism?, supra note 10, at 726–27, 727 n.67; see, e.g., Hillside Dairy Inc. v. Ly-
ons, 539 U.S. 59, 66 (2003) (“Congress certainly has the power to authorize state regulations that 
burden or discriminate against interstate commerce.”). 
 28 See, e.g., Healy v. Beer Inst., Inc., 491 U.S. 324, 336 (1989) (holding that a Connecticut 
statute prohibiting an interstate beer distributor from selling to Connecticut clients at higher prices 
than they charged in surrounding states violated the Commerce Clause); Edgar v. MITE Corp., 
457 U.S. 624, 642–43 (1982). 
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or not the commerce has effects within the State.’”29 Whether that was ever 
accurate,30 and what if any of this doctrine remains valid today,31 are im-
portant questions that courts and scholars are still discussing.32 
These complicated doctrinal questions need not detain us, however, be-
cause the Dormant Commerce Clause’s limitations do not constrain Congress. 
Because Dormant Commerce Clause doctrines are judge-made restrictions on 
states in areas of unexercised Commerce Clause power, Congress is always 
free to exercise those Commerce Clause powers by enacting legislation that 
reverses Dormant Commerce Clause restrictions.33 So even if Dormant 
Commerce Clause doctrine prohibited states from regulating commerce out-
side their borders, federal legislation could lift those limitations. 
Professor Seth Kreimer has argued that Article IV’s Privileges and 
Immunities Clause provides another important limitation on state extraterri-
toriality.34 Also known as the Comity Clause, it provides “[t]he citizens of 
each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in 
the several States.”35 Kreimer argues that a Home State’s attempt to extra-
territorially regulate its citizen while they visited another state would run 
afoul of the Privileges and Immunities Clause, insofar as the visitor would 
not enjoy the same privileges and immunities as the Host State’s citizens.36 
Elsewhere I have argued that Kreimer’s argument is not correct as a matter 
of black letter law.37 But even if he were right, the Comity Clause would 
not restrict Congress’s powers to set states’ extraterritorial powers because 
the Clause’s language by its terms limits states, not Congress.38 Indeed, Pro-
                                                                                                                           
 29 Healy, 491 U.S. at 336 (quoting Edgar, 457 U.S. at 642–43); see Rosen, State Extraterrito-
rial Powers Reconsidered, supra note 10, at 1126–27. 
 30 Elsewhere I have suggested not. See Rosen, supra note 5, at 919–30; Rosen, Hard or Soft 
Pluralism?, supra note 10, at 727–30. 
 31 See Energy & Env’t Legal Inst. v. Epel, 793 F.3d 1169, 1174–75 (10th Cir. 2015). 
 32 This Article is part of a symposium that addresses these questions. See Jessica Berch, Reef-
er Madness: How Non-Legalizing States Can Revamp Dram Shop Laws to Protect Themselves 
from Marijuana Spillover from Their Legalizing Neighbors, 58 B.C. L. REV. (forthcoming May 
2017); Chad DeVeaux, One Toke Too Far: The Demise of the Dormant Commerce Clause’s Ex-
traterritoriality Doctrine Threatens the Marijuana Legalization Experiment, 58 B.C. L. REV. 
(forthcoming May 2017). 
 33 See Rosen, Hard or Soft Pluralism?, supra note 10, at 727 n.67; Metzger, supra note 18, at 
1480–85; see, e.g., Hillside Dairy, 539 U.S. at 66. 
 34 Seth F. Kreimer, Lines in the Sand: The Importance of Borders in American Federalism, 
150 U. PA. L. REV. 973, 1000 (2002) 
 35 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1; see Kreimer, supra note 34, at 1000. 
 36 See Kreimer, supra note 34, at 1000, 1003. 
 37 See Rosen, Hard or Soft Pluralism?, supra note 10, at 733–36. The Comity Clause prevents 
a Host State from discriminating against its out-of-state visitors. It does not limit a Home State’s 
powers to regulate its traveling citizens, nor does the Comity Clause prevent a Host State from 
cooperating with the visitor’s Home State by allowing Home State law to govern a visitor. See id.  
 38 See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1.  
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fessor Gillian Metzger has persuasively argued that Congress has power to 
license state conduct that otherwise would violate the Privileges and Im-
munities Clause, as is true of Dormant Commerce Clause restrictions.39 
B. Sources of Congressional Authority to Set States’  
Extraterritorial Powers 
Having discussed two restrictions on states that would not carry over to 
Congress, it is time to identify the affirmative sources of congressional au-
thority to set state extraterritorial powers. There are three: the Commerce 
Clause, the Effects Clause, and Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment.40 
The Commerce Clause undoubtedly is the most obvious source to con-
temporary constitutionalists. The Commerce Clause’s applicability to state 
extraterritoriality is the flipside of the Dormant Commerce Clause’s anti-
extraterritoriality doctrine. Yet although Congress likely has substantial au-
thority under contemporary Commerce Clause jurisprudence to regulate 
extraterritoriality, there are two reasons the Clause cannot ground compre-
hensive legislation setting states’ extraterritorial powers. 
First, any activity that Congress regulates under the Commerce Clause 
itself must qualify as “economic.”41 Thus although a visitor’s consumption 
of a good or service may be within Congress’s regulatory authority, her non-
economic activities would not. For example, Congress probably could not 
use the Commerce Clause to extend a Home State’s marijuana prohibition 
to its citizen’s marijuana use in a regulatorily permissive Host State if the 
marijuana were supplied gratis by a friend who lives in the Host State. 
Second, today’s jurisprudence would allow Congress to regulate under 
the Commerce Clause only if the visitor’s economic activity in the Host 
State “substantially affects interstate commerce.”42 As to those economic 
activities that would not satisfy this requirement if undertaken by the Host 
State’s citizens, there will not be Commerce Clause power to regulate the 
                                                                                                                           
 39 See Metzger, supra note 18, at 1486–88 (concluding that “[g]iven the overlap of the two 
clauses [the Commerce Clause and the Privileges and Immunities Clause], Congress’s ability to 
authorize Dormant Commerce Clause violations by the states would seem to entail that Congress 
also possesses power to authorize discriminatory state regulations that are currently prohibited by 
the Privileges and Immunities Clause”). This is not to suggest that Congress’s powers in this re-
gard are without limit. See id. at 1512–31. 
 40 See Rosen, Hard or Soft Pluralism?, supra note 10, at 752–57. 
 41 Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 17 (2005). Though “economic” does not apply to the first 
and second prongs taken from United States v. Lopez, most state regulations do not apply to the 
channels (prong one) or instrumentalities (prong two) of interstate commerce. See United States v. 
Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 559 (1995). 
 42 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 560. See the caveat supra note 41 as regards Lopez’s first and second 
prongs, as to which the substantially affects interstate commerce requirement does not apply. 
2017] State Extraterritoriality and Congress 1021 
visitor unless the spillover effects in their Home State “substantially affect” 
interstate commerce. Would the bare fact that a visitor’s out-of-state activity 
undermined their Home State’s law satisfy this requirement? If not,43 then 
we have identified a second reason why the Commerce Clause cannot be 
the sole ground for comprehensive federal regulation setting state extraterri-
torial powers. 
There are two other sources of congressional power that are more con-
ceptually and doctrinally suited than the Commerce Clause to setting states’ 
extraterritorial powers. The constitutional grant most closely allied to de-
termining the scope of states’ regulatory authority is the “Effects Clause,” 
which is part of the Full Faith and Credit Clause.44 The Full Faith and Cred-
it Clause’s first sentence provides that “Full Faith and Credit shall be given 
in each State to the public Acts . . . of every other State,” and its second sen-
tence states that “Congress may by general Laws prescribe . . . the Effect” 
of such “Acts.”45 The Full Faith and Credit’s language of “public Acts” long 
has been understood to encompass state legislation,46 and also likely in-
cludes common law.47 Citing the Effects Clause’s plain language, the Su-
preme Court has said Congress can “prescribe[]” the “extra-state effect” of 
a state statute.48 Congress has relied on the Effects Clause to enact a few 
statutes that determine the scope of States’ extraterritorial powers in discrete 
circumstances.49 
In short, the Full Faith and Credit Clause explicitly gives Congress 
power to determine what effect one state’s law is to have in another state. 
Probably because the Effects Clause is designed to address extraterritoriali-
ty, it is not subject to the limitations identified just above that make the 
Commerce Clause incapable of comprehensively grounding a federal law 
setting states’ extraterritorial powers.50 In fact, the Supreme Court has not 
                                                                                                                           
 43 The question would then arise as to what other factors must be present to support Com-
merce Clause regulation of a visitor’s extraterritorial activities. 
 44 Rosen, Hard or Soft Pluralism?, supra note 10, at 752 (citing U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1); 
see also Rosen, Choice-of-Law, supra note 10, at 1093–94. 
 45 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1. 
 46 See Baker v. Gen. Motors Corp., 522 U.S. 222, 232 (1998). 
 47 Though “public Acts” was not originally understood to include common law, there are 
powerful reasons to do so post-Erie. See Elliott E. Cheatham, Federal Control of Conflict of Laws, 
6 VAND. L. REV. 581, 603 (1951) (citing Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt, 320 U.S. 430, 436 
(1943)) (“There is a categorical statement by the Supreme Court of the United States that common 
law is within the protection of the [Full Faith and Credit] clause.”); Rosen, Choice-of-Law, supra 
note 10, at 1094 & nn.385–87;   
 48 Pac. Emp’rs Ins. Co. v. Indus. Accident Comm’n, 306 U.S. 493, 502 (1939). 
 49 See Rosen, State Extraterritorial Powers Reconsidered, supra note 10, at 1141–42 (dis-
cussing the Parental Kidnapping Protection Act, codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1738A (2012)). 
 50 See supra notes 41–43 and accompanying text. 
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identified any limits on Congress’s Effects Clause powers that derive from 
the Effects Clause itself.51 Although Congress’s powers under the Effects 
Clause are constrained by constitutional principles extrinsic to that Clause 
(as discussed further below), the Effects Clause probably is sufficient in and 
of itself to be the source of comprehensive federal legislation setting states’ 
extraterritorial powers. 
Though the Effects Clause may suffice, it is important to observe that 
Congress may have yet another source of power to set states’ extraterritorial 
powers, namely Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment. Section Five 
grants Congress the “power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provi-
sions of” the Fourteenth Amendment, which thereby includes Section One’s 
references to both state and national citizenship.52 Congress’s enforcement 
power under Section Five may include setting states’ extraterritorial powers 
because extraterritoriality is a crucial determinant of the nature of both state 
and national citizenship.53 As to the nature of state citizenship: it must be de-
termined whether state citizenship includes possibly being subject to the regu-
latory jurisdiction of one’s Home State while in a sister state if one’s out-of-
state activity risks undermining a Home State policy as to which there is no 
requirement of nationwide uniformity. As to the nature of federal citizenship: 
it must be determined whether we are citizens of a nation that has a federal 
regime of Soft or Hard Pluralism. To wit, are we citizens of a nation of Soft 
Pluralism, where each citizen of the United States has a right to all “goods 
and services available in the sister states to which a United States citizen 
travels?”54 Or are we citizens of a nation whose federal union allows for 
Hard Pluralism, where the fact that every citizen “can, of his own volition, 
become a citizen of any State of the Union”55 matters so much because state 
citizenship really matters, because (among other reasons) one’s home state 
can extraterritorially regulate to assure the efficacy of state policies? 
The point for present purposes is not to decide once and for all the 
substantive question of whether states should have extraterritorial powers, 
but to appreciate that whether they do has profound implications for the 
nature of state and national citizenship. Because extraterritoriality is so 
                                                                                                                           
 51 Moreover, “[t]he Court has observed that the Effects Clause gives Congress the power to 
enact rules regarding the requirements of full faith and credit that vary from those that the Court 
has identified.” Rosen, Hard or Soft Pluralism?, supra note 10, at 753. 
 52 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §§ 1, 5 (declaring that “[a]ll persons born or naturalized in the 
United States . . . are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside,” and that 
“[n]o State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of 
citizens of the United States”). 
 53 See infra notes 106–120 and accompanying text.  
 54 See Rosen, Hard or Soft Pluralism?, supra note 10, at 741. 
 55 Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S 36 (16 Wall.), 80 (1872). 
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connected to citizenship, Congress’s enforcement powers under Section 
Five properly extend to extraterritoriality determinations. 
The conclusion that Section Five authorizes extraterritoriality determi-
nations may seem superfluous, on account of Congress’s broad Effects 
Clause powers. Perhaps. Even so, understanding that Congress has powers 
under Section Five to determine the scope of states’ extraterritorial powers 
may be beneficial. First, Congress’s Effects Clause and Section Five powers 
may be mutually reinforcing, especially if there were any doubts as to 
whether its Effects Clause powers extend to the profound task of determin-
ing the nature of our federal union. Second, because Section Five connects 
extraterritoriality to citizenship, Section Five can help sustain conceptual 
clarity as to what is at stake in setting states’ extraterritorial powers. Third, 
though jurisprudence has not yet identified any internal limitations of the 
Effects Clause, this may be an artifact of the paucity of case law concerning 
that Clause, on account of its having only been sparsely relied upon by 
Congress. Were Congress to more heavily lean on the Effects Clause, cases 
might arise that permit the Court to identify appropriate internal limits to 
the Effects Clause. Any such limitations would not necessarily carry over to 
Section Five, which authorizes only the subset of extraterritorial determina-
tions that help determine the nature of state and national citizenship. To put 
it a bit differently, Congress’s Effects Clause and Section Five powers may 
not be perfectly coincident after all. 
It might be thought that the U.S. Supreme Court’s conclusions in City 
of Boerne v. Flores as to the “remedial, rather than substantive, nature of” 
Section Five56 would preclude Congress’s use of Section Five to set states’ 
extraterritorial powers pursuant to its own substantive views as to state and 
national citizenship. Yet “[t]his is not a necessary interpretation, however, or 
even the best one” of Boerne’s holding.57 Boerne chastised Congress for aim-
ing to statutorily override an earlier constitutional holding, and used Boerne 
as an opportunity to reiterate Marbury’s assertion of judicial supremacy over 
Congress in determining what the Constitution permits.58 Nothing in Boerne’s 
reasoning suggests Congress cannot come to, and act upon, its own substan-
tive understandings of the Fourteenth Amendment where the Court has not 
yet offered its own. And it would be unfortunate were Boerne so extended. 
Where Congress is the first-mover in relation to a constitutional question, 
its constitutional input should be solicited, not quashed. Congress is a coor-
dinate branch of the federal government, and its many distinctive institu-
                                                                                                                           
 56 City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 520 (1997). 
 57 Id. at 528. The irony of my use of this quotation for this purpose is intentional. 
 58 See id. at 527–29. 
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tional characteristics can add important value within the multi-step and mul-
ti-institutional process through which our polity comes to its ultimate con-
stitutional judgments.59 
The proposition that Boerne does not disable Congress from rendering 
its own substantive constitutional judgment where the Court has not yet 
spoken leaves unanswered the question of how much deference courts 
should give to Congress’s constitutional judgment. Contemporary jurispru-
dence and scholarship chronicle many factors that are relevant to setting the 
appropriate level of judicial deference,60 and this Article does not purport to 
answer that question in relation to Section Five. This much can be said, 
however: Congress’s compliance with the Special Norms ought to increase 
the deference-worthiness of Congress’s constitutional judgment.61 
C. Constitutional Limits on Congress 
Having identified the constitutional sources of Congress’s authority to 
set states’ extraterritorial powers, it is time to consider the several constitu-
tional limits to those powers. These constitutional limits restrict the states as 
well,62 though several conceivably could apply differently to the federal 
government.63 
To be clear, the goal here is not to identify the precise metes and 
bounds of these constitutional constraints, but to flag the constitutional con-
siderations that would be applicable to Congress’s extraterritorial determi-
nations. The Supreme Court has not yet determined the precise limits of 
several of these constitutional limitations. A consequence of this is that 
Congress should seriously address these constitutional considerations if64 
and when it takes up the question of states’ extraterritorial powers. 
                                                                                                                           
 59 See Rosen, Hard of Soft Pluralism?, supra note 10, at 750–52; Rosen, Special Norms The-
sis, supra note 19, at 13–16. 
 60 See Mark D. Rosen, The Surprisingly Strong Case for Tailoring Constitutional Principles, 
153 U. PA. L. REV. 1513, 1582–96 (2005). See generally, e.g., JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY 
AND DISTRUST (1980) (providing an overview and analysis of judicial review).  
 61 See Rosen, Special Norms Thesis, supra note 19, at 4. 
 62 Contra notes 27–39 (considering limits that apply to states but not to Congress). 
 63 See Rosen, supra note 60, at 1527–38 (considering four approaches to applying limits dif-
ferently to the federal and state governments). 
 64 Under some circumstances Congress may be obligated to address state extraterritoriality. In 
other words, though Congress typically is master of its legislative agenda, whether Congress ad-
dresses state extraterritoriality may not be a matter of unfettered discretion. See infra notes 135–
141 and accompanying text. 
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1. Due Process 
The first constitutional limitation to consider is due process. A substan-
tial body of case law considers whether states can apply their laws extrater-
ritorially. Although due process certainly imposes some limitations, it is 
clear that a state’s extraterritorial application of its law is not per se uncon-
stitutional.65 The Supreme Court has upheld the application of a Home 
State’s law to its citizens when they were outside the Home State’s bor-
ders,66 and even the application of a state’s law to the out-of-state conduct 
of a non-citizen.67 Relying on these and other cases, the Restatements and 
Model Codes forthrightly recognize that extraterritoriality is not per se in-
consistent with due process.68 
More specifically, case law requires a state to have “a significant con-
tact . . . creating state interests, such that choice of its law is neither arbi-
trary nor fundamentally unfair.”69 As I have shown elsewhere, citizenship 
on its own has sufficed to give the Home State adequate interest to regulate 
its citizens’ out-of-state activities for purposes of the Due Process Clause, at 
least when those activities have some effects in the Home State.70 Although 
the case law regarding non-citizens is less well-developed, it is clear that 
                                                                                                                           
 65 See Rosen, Hard or Soft Pluralism?, supra note 10, at 718–25; Rosen, Extraterritoriality 
and Political Heterogeneity, supra note 10, at 882–91. 
 66 See Skiriotes v. Florida, 313 U.S. 69, 77 (1941); see also Rosen, Hard or Soft Pluralism?, 
supra note 10, at 719 (discussing Skiriotes). 
 67 See Strassheim v. Daily, 221 U.S. 280, 281–82 (1911); see also Rosen, Hard or Soft Plu-
ralism?, supra note 10, at 719 (discussing Strassheim). 
 68 The Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law provides that States “may apply at least 
some laws to a person outside [State] territory on the basis that he is a citizen, resident, or domicil-
iary of the State.” RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 402 n.5 (AM. LAW 
INST., 1987). Directed to the criminal context, the Model Penal Code provides that State A may 
impose liability if “the offense is based on a statute of this State that expressly prohibits conduct 
outside the State . . . .” MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.03(1)(f) (AM. LAW INST., 1962). The Model 
Penal Code affirms that State A has extraterritorial legislative jurisdiction even if the activity it 
prohibits occurs in a State in which the activity is permissible. Id. § 1.03(2). The major limitation 
identified by the Model Penal Code is that the regulated conduct must “bear[] a reasonable rela-
tion to a legitimate interest of [the regulating] State . . . .” Id. § 1.03(1)(f). The Comment states 
that the “reasonable relation to a legitimate interest” requirement “expresses the general principle 
of the fourteenth amendment limitation on state legislative jurisdiction.” See id. § 1.03 cmt. 6. 
 69 Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 818 (1985) (quoting Allstate Ins. Co. v. 
Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 312–13 (1981)). 
 70 See Shutts, 427 U.S. at 842 n.24 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) 
(observing that neither party in the case “nor the Court contends that Kansas cannot constitutional-
ly apply its own laws to the claims of Kansas residents, even though the leased land may lie in 
other States and no other apparent connection to Kansas may exist”); Rosen, Extraterritoriality 
and Political Heterogeneity, supra note 10, at 871–76. 
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extraterritorial regulation of noncitizens also is not per se unconstitutional.71 
Courts can be expected to draw upon several due process doctrines that po-
lice adjudicatory jurisdiction (probably the most obvious candidate being 
purposeful ailment) in determining when extraterritorial regulations may be 
applied against non-citizens, even though adjudicatory and regulatory juris-
diction are conceptually and doctrinally distinct.72 This Article identifies an 
additional consideration that may be relevant to due process’s limits on reg-
ulatory jurisdiction, though it has no bearing on adjudicatory jurisdiction.73 
The Supreme Court’s due process jurisprudence in relation to extrater-
ritoriality has been developed in the context of challenges to states’ actions. 
The question arises as to whether these Fourteenth Amendment-based re-
strictions on states would carry over to the Fifth Amendment’s due process 
limitations on Congress.74 Though there are strong reasons why constitu-
tional doctrines concerning horizontal federalism might vary depending on 
whether the federal government or a state undertook the legal challenge,75 
two considerations suggest that Congress likely would be held to the same 
due process limits on extraterritoriality that the Court has applied to the 
states. First, the Court lately has resisted differentiating between states and 
the federal government in regard to constitutional restrictions, preferring 
instead to treat limits that apply to more than one level of government in a 
“one-size-fits-all” rather than a “tailored” manner.76 Second, the Fourteenth 
Amendment restriction the Court has identified seems equally appropriate 
to Congress in this context. Congress, like the states, should not extend a 
                                                                                                                           
 71 See supra note 67 and accompanying text (citing support for extraterritorial regulation of 
non-citizens); see also Bernhard v. Harrah’s Club, 16 Cal. 3d 313, 323 (1976) (applying a Califor-
nia dram shop law to a Nevada tavern keeper for drinks served in Nevada to a California citizen). 
 72 See Hague, 449 U.S. at 317, 330 n.23 (plurality opinion) (noting that “[t]he The Court has 
recognized that examination of a State’s contacts may result in divergent conclusions for jurisdic-
tion and choice-of-law purposes”) (citing Kulko v. Superior Court of California, 436 U.S. 84, 98 
(1978)). 
 73 Namely, a duty for states to support their sister states. See Bradford Elec. Light Co. v. 
Clapper, 286 U.S. 145, 159 (1932) (requiring one state to apply another’s different law because 
“[i]f this were not so . . . the effectiveness of the [sister state’s] act would be gravely impaired”); 
see also infra note 196 and accompanying text. 
 74 See Rosen, supra note 60, at 1582–90 (considering the impact of malfunctions in the repre-
sentative process at the state and federal levels on the need to tailor constitutional principles at 
different levels). But see infra note 76 and accompanying text. 
 75 See Rosen, supra note 60, at 1583–87. 
 76 See id. at 1516 (distinguishing “one-size-fits-all” from “tailoring”); see also, e.g., McDon-
ald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 765–67, 784–85 (2010) (holding that Second Amendment 
restrictions apply in the same way to federal and state governments); Adarand Constructors, Inc. 
v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 226–27 (1995) (announcing the principle of “congruence between the 
standards applicable to federal and state racial classifications”). But see Rosen, supra note 60, at 
1557–80. 
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state’s law beyond its borders if this would be “arbitrary . . . or fundamen-
tally unfair.”77 Perhaps, however, a reviewing court should give more defer-
ence to Congress’s judgment than to a state’s when applying this standard, 
particularly if there are indicia of deference-worthiness,78 insofar as con-
gressional action eliminates concerns that externalities are being imposed 
on unrepresented outsiders.79 
2. The Right to Travel, and the Nature of Citizenship 
A second constitutional constraint that may apply to federal law  set-
ting the bounds of state extraterritoriality is the right to travel. I say may 
because the Court has never held that the right to travel applies to extraterri-
torial legislation designed to secure the efficacy of a Home State’s law. No 
case has held that State A’s effort to bar its citizen from doing in State B 
what State B allows its own citizens implicates the right to travel.80 Nor 
does this sort of extraterritorial regulation run afoul of any of the “three dif-
ferent components” of the right to travel that the U.S. Supreme Court identi-
fied in Saenz v. Roe in 1999, the Court’s most recent right to travel deci-
sion.81 To wit, federal legislation authorizing a Home State to extraterritori-
ally regulate so it can secure the efficacy of its distinctive law does not deny 
[1] the right of a citizen of one State to enter and to leave another State, vio-
late [2] the right to be treated as a welcome visitor rather than an unfriendly 
alien when temporarily present in the second State, or [3] for those travelers 
who elect to become permanent residents, undermine the right to be treated 
like other citizens of that State.82 Simply put, a state’s extraterritorial regu-
lation of its own citizens interferes with none of the three components that 
Saenz ascribes to the right to travel. 
Notwithstanding Saenz, Professor Kreimer has forcefully argued that 
the right to travel limits the degree to which State A can regulate its citizens 
                                                                                                                           
 77 See Shutts, 472 U.S. at 818 (internal quotation omitted) (quoting Allstate, 449 U.S. at 326) 
(Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)). 
 78 For example, compliance with the Special Norms, or at least evidence that Congress specif-
ically considered the constitutional question and rendered a constitutional decision. See Rosen, 
Special Norms Thesis, supra note 19, at 4. 
 79 See Rosen, supra note 60, at 1583–87; see also Adam Winkler, Fatal in Theory and Strict 
in Fact: An Empirical Analysis of Strict Scrutiny in the Federal Courts, 59 VAND. L. REV. 793, 
821–23 (2006) (arguing that courts sometimes give more deference to Congress than the states 
when applying the formally identical legal test). 
 80 See Rosen, Extraterritoriality and Political Heterogeneity, supra note 10, at 913–14; see 
also Kreimer, supra note 34, at 1008 (acknowledging that no case has held that extraterritorial 
regulation implicates the right to travel). 
 81 See Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 500 (1999); Rosen, Hard or Soft Pluralism?, supra note 
10, at 736–37. 
 82 See Saenz, 526 U.S. at 500. 
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when they are located in a sister-state.83 In his view, the value of the right to 
travel would be largely gutted if a visitor were still governed by her Home 
State’s law.84 Elsewhere I have explained at length that Kreimer’s view is not 
supported by the case law.85 But as I also have previously stated, Kreimer’s 
approach is conceptually plausible,86 and our current right to travel doctrine 
cannot be safely assumed to be settled because, among other reasons, there is 
not a societal consensus regarding extraterritoriality embodied either in wide-
spread practice or broad based acceptance.87 For these reasons, Kreimer’s 
position is fairly characterized as a plausible prescriptive argument, even if 
it is not descriptive of present doctrine. 
Because the right to travel is plausibly implicated by state extraterrito-
riality, and because it cannot be safely assumed that Saenz’s doctrine has 
reached a stable final resting state, it would be appropriate for Congress to 
forthrightly consider what if any implications it believes the right to travel 
has on state extraterritoriality.88 Part III shows that Professor Kreimer’s 
view is not the only plausible approach, as it sketches the Special Norms’ 
decisional framework that Congress ought to use when considering the 
scope of state extraterritoriality.89 Before doing so, however, this Article 
addresses a few more matters concerning the right to travel that provide 
doctrinal and conceptual clarity, and that bolster the position that Congress 
has a crucial constitutional decisionmaking role as regards states’ extraterri-
torial powers. 
Though the right to travel is a long recognized constitutional principle, 
the Court has labored long and hard to locate its source. For some time the 
                                                                                                                           
 83 See Kreimer, supra note 8, at 914–17. 
 84 See id. at 915. 
 85 See Rosen, Extraterritoriality and Political Heterogeneity, supra note 10, at 913–19. 
 86 See Rosen, Extraterritoriality Reconsidered, supra note 10, at 1137 n.17. 
 87 See Rosen, Hard or Soft Pluralism?, supra note 10, at 738–40 (“[A]lthough states have 
been regulating their citizens’ extraterritorial conduct from the earliest days of our country’s histo-
ry, the practice has not been widespread and has not received considerable attention. There ac-
cordingly is not a societal consensus concerning extraterritorial regulation embodied either in 
widespread practice or broad-ranging acceptance that this is a legitimate (albeit unusual) form of 
state regulation. Nor has the Supreme Court ever directly confronted the constitutionality of a 
home state’s effort to extraterritorially regulate its citizens to ensure that they do not seek to cir-
cumvent the home state’s policies.”). 
 88 Though extraterritoriality does not fall into any of Saenz’s three components, see supra 
note 81 and accompanying text, extraterritoriality implicates national citizenship, which Saenz 
connected to the third component. Further, the Saenz Court explicitly stated that the third compo-
nent “is a limitation on the powers of the National Government as well as the States,” and has 
applied its restrictions identically to both the federal and state government. Saenz, 526 U.S. at 
507–11. But see Rosen, supra note 60, at 1542–43 (criticizing Saenz’s refusal to give serious con-
sideration to tailoring). 
 89 See infra notes 121–204 and accompanying text. 
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Court grounded the right to travel in the Equal Protection Clause,90 though 
Saenz appears to have rejected this approach.91 Saenz sourced the right to 
travel’s second component in Article IV’s Privileges and Immunities 
Clause,92 the third component in the Fourteenth Amendment’s Citizenship 
Clause,93 and decided that it “need not identify the source of” the first com-
ponent.94  
In other words, two centuries of Supreme Court jurisprudence has led 
to the conclusion that an unenumerated right to travel is composed of two 
distinct enumerated constitutional components (one from Article IV, the 
other from the Fourteenth Amendment) and one as-of-yet textually uniden-
tified component. Furthermore, the Court has concluded that the right to 
travel sometimes restricts only the states,95 sometimes constrains the federal 
government as well,96 and sometimes reaches individuals too.97 This doctri-
nal hodgepodge, both as to the right to travel’s constitutional source and the 
right’s consequences, is pretty strange. 
There is a more straightforward doctrinal approach.98 All three compo-
nents of what the Court calls the right to travel are naturally conceptualized 
as the entailments of federal and state citizenship in our federal union. This 
conclusion comfortably aligns with two-thirds of the Court’s jurisprudence, 
which grounds the right to travel’s second component in the constitutional 
text concerning the privileges and immunities attaching to state citizenship, 
                                                                                                                           
 90 See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 632–3 (1969); see also Saenz, 526 U.S. at 499 
(recognizing that Shapiro “held that a classification that had the effect of imposing a penalty on 
the exercise of the right to travel violated the Equal Protection Clause”). 
 91 See Saenz, 526 U.S. at 500–04 (not grounding any of the three components of the right to 
travel in the Equal Protection Clause). 
 92 See id. at 501. 
 93 See id. at 502–04. 
 94 See id. at 501. 
 95 This is true of the second component, which is none other than Article IV’s Privileges and 
Immunities Clause. See supra notes 35–39 and accompanying text. 
 96 See Rosen, Hard or Soft Pluralism?, supra note 10, at 752–57. 
 97 See Saenz, 526 U.S. at 498 (noting that the right to travel’s first component is “assertable 
against private interference as well as governmental action . . . a virtually unconditional personal 
right, guaranteed by the Constitution to us all”) (internal quotation omitted) (quoting Shapiro, 394 
U.S. at 643). 
 98 It is an interesting question as to whether doctrinal simplicity is a normative good. Put 
differently, does Occam’s razor always carry over to doctrinal analysis? See generally Alan Baker, 
Simplicity, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHILOSOPHY, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2011/
entries/simplicity/#OntPar [https://perma.cc/SA3G-RY6N] (last visited Mar. 22, 2017) (discussing 
Occam’s Razor, the principle of parsimony, and why “[m]ost philosophers believe that, other 
things being equal, simpler theories are better”). I myself am skeptical, though this is not the place 
to fully explore this issue. Suffice it to say that doctrinal simplicity is not the only consideration 
favoring the reorientation suggested above in text. Improved conceptual clarity, the second con-
sideration I offer, seems more important.  
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and the right-to-travel’s third component in the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
national citizenship clause. My claim suggests a source for the as-of-yet 
textually ungrounded first component: the national citizenship clause, on 
the theory that an entailment of our national citizenship is that everyone can 
leave their Home State and enter any other.99 
Put another way, the right to travel does not stand above federal and 
state citizenship as Saenz would have it, but derives from them. Grounding 
the unenumerated right to travel in (enumerated) federal and state citizen-
ship is a simpler, more straightforward doctrinal approach than is Saenz’s 
chimeric amalgam in which two textually enumerated rights, in conjunction 
with an unenumerated right, are said to all together constitute an unenumer-
ated, and conceptually prior, right to travel.100 
There are conceptual advantages to understanding the right to travel as 
textually deriving from, and being an entailment of, national and state citi-
zenship in our federal union. Citizenship is the more apt frame because it 
provides space for considering not only the individual, but also the interests 
of states and the federal union.101 Citizenship invites these additional consid-
erations because citizenship is the amalgamation of properties that determine 
the individual’s relation to his or her polity. The right to travel, by contrast, is 
a linguistic frame that is oriented to the individual, and for that reason may 
slight considerations of states and the federal union. For this reason, the 
right to travel’s frame may operate so as to put a sub rosa thumb on the 
scales in favor of the individual. 
The topic of extraterritoriality illustrates citizenship’s superior concep-
tual frame. Analyzing the normativity of extraterritoriality by only consider-
ing how it impacts the individual traveler is incomplete. Extraterritoriality is 
a determinant of the extent to which states can have efficacious divergent 
policies where federal law does not demand nationwide uniformity. As such, 
extraterritoriality is a determinant of the degree to which states are meaning-
fully empowered sub-federal polities. Insofar as it determines whether we 
have a regime of Hard or Soft Pluralism,102 the scope of states’ extraterrito-
                                                                                                                           
 99 See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“All persons born or naturalized in the United States . . . 
are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside . . . .”)  
 100 In this sense, Saenz echoes Justice Douglas’ much maligned approach to finding a consti-
tutional right to privacy in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 481–86 (1965). 
 101 The analysis above in text assumes that word choice can influence outcomes by framing 
the way an issue is analyzed. See generally Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, The Framing of 
Decisions and the Psychology of Choice, 211 SCIENCE 453 (1981) ("[D]escrib[ing] decision prob-
lems in which people systematically violate the requirements of consistency and coherence, and 
[tracing] these violations to the psychological principles that govern the perception of decision 
problems and the evaluation of options.”). 
 102 See supra notes 15–17 and accompanying text. 
2017] State Extraterritoriality and Congress 1031 
rial powers literally shapes the very nature of our federal union. Surely 
these structural implications of extraterritoriality ought to be taken into ac-
count, along with extraterritoriality’s effects on the traveling individual and 
those individuals with whom he or she interacts, when assessing the norma-
tivity of extraterritoriality. The right to travel’s more individual-oriented 
frame risks systematically undervaluing, or even fully overlooking, extrater-
ritoriality’s impact on states and our federal union. 
Finally, there may be institutional benefits to reorienting extraterritori-
ality analysis from the right to travel to citizenship. Insofar as extraterritori-
ality determines whether we have a federal union that allows for Hard Plu-
ralism or only Soft Pluralism, extraterritoriality quite literally implicates what 
national citizenship in the United States means. When the U.S. Supreme 
Court first confronted national citizenship’s entailments in the Slaughter-
House Cases in 1872 it mostly punted, concluding “we may hold ourselves 
excused from defining the privileges and immunities of citizens of the Unit-
ed States which no State can abridge, until some case involving those privi-
leges may make it necessary to do so.”103 The Court has done virtually 
nothing since to further flesh out national citizenship’s entailments,104 and 
has given virtually no attention to whether our federal union requires Soft 
Pluralism or allows Hard Pluralism. Extraterritoriality’s connection to citi-
zenship brings to mind Slaughter-House’s acknowledgment that we have 
yet to fully understand what national citizenship entails. And this bolsters 
the case that Congress has room to formulate its own views on the constitu-
tional issues that inform extraterritoriality. 
II. EXTRATERRITORIALITY AND CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONMAKING 
Part I explained the several sources of Congress’s constitutional au-
thority to regulate state extraterritoriality, as well as the constitutional limits 
to which those powers are subject. This Part unpacks an important implica-
tion of Part I’s analysis. Many considerations that inform whether Congress 
should enact federal legislation regarding state extraterritoriality, and if so 
what it should enact, belong to what might be called the constitutional do-
main, not just the domain of ordinary politics. As a result, Congress must 
engage in substantial constitutional decisionmaking in connection with state 
                                                                                                                           
 103 Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 78–79. Though the decision ultimately “ven-
ture[d] to suggest some which own their existence to the Federal government, its National charac-
ter, its Constitution, or its laws,” its enumeration clearly was not intended to be comprehensive. Id. 
at 79 (emphasis added). 
 104 Saenz v. Roe appears to be the only other case where the Court has taken up the question. 
See Saenz, 526 U.S. at 502 n.15. 
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extraterritoriality. Part III fleshes out important implications of the fact that 
Congress’s decisions in relation to state extraterritoriality are substantially 
informed by constitutional considerations.105 
It is easy to overlook the unusually broad scope of Congress’s constitu-
tional decisionmaking in relation to state extraterritoriality. To be sure, “all 
congressional action contains at least one constitutional ingredient: a 
preliminary determination that Congress has constitutional power to un-
dertake the action.”106 Much of Part I addressed this threshold power ques-
tion, a question that appropriately precedes all congressional action. Most 
of the time, however, after Congress decides it has power to act, the subse-
quent decisions of whether it should act, and if so what it should do, are 
informed predominantly, if not exclusively, by sub-constitutional policy 
considerations.107 As regards to state extraterritoriality, however, the wheth-
er and what determinations are substantially informed by constitutional 
considerations. It is in this respect that constitutional considerations play a 
far larger role than usual when it comes to state extraterritoriality. 
To understand the prominence of constitutional considerations in rela-
tion to the whether and what of state extraterritoriality, consider the follow-
ing not-too-fanciful thought experiment. Nevada and Utah share a border, 
and marijuana use is permitted in the latter but not the former. Utah does 
not want its citizens using marijuana in neighboring Nevada, or elsewhere, 
so it enacts a law proscribing its citizens from so doing, and sets substantial 
civil penalties for any violations. Utah also prohibits the sale or gift of mari-
juana to any Utah citizen, regardless of where the sale or gift occurs. Many 
states hostile to marijuana enact legislation similar to Utah’s. 
If this occurred, Utah and its followers would have created a regime of 
Hard Pluralism. Because neither Supreme Court jurisprudence nor settled 
practice determines whether our federal union allows Hard Pluralism or 
requires Soft Pluralism, those state cannot be said to have plainly acted un-
constitutionally.108 This does not mean, however, that they would have the 
last word on the subject. As explained above in Part I, Congress has power 
to ratify their extraterritorial assertions, reverse them, or limit them.109  
Now consider:  must Congress do anything? Under some circumstanc-
es the answer would appear to be yes, on account of Congress’s substantive 
constitutional views concerning the choice between Hard and Soft Plural-
                                                                                                                           
 105 See infra notes 121–204 and accompanying text. 
 106 See Rosen, Special Norms Thesis, supra note 19, at 13. 
 107 See id. 
 108 See Rosen, Hard or Soft Pluralism?, supra note 10, at 744–50. 
 109 See supra notes 40–104 and accompanying text. 
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ism. In other words, the determination of whether Congress should act 
might belong to the domain of constitutional decisionmaking.  
To see why, first assume that Congress believes our federal union de-
mands Soft Pluralism. If so, then Utah and its followers have acted uncon-
stitutionally in a realm as to which it is within Congress’s power to remedy. 
This naturally raises the question of whether there exists a constitutional 
duty for Congress to immediately act. The answer is probably not, because 
there are other governmental institutions that can be expected to step in—
courts. What if, however, courts uphold the state regulations, on the view 
that the Dormant Commerce Clause does not prohibit non-protectionist ex-
traterritorial regulations? States would be acting in a manner inconsistent 
with Congress’s understanding of what horizontal federalism entails. This 
would be a constitutional error within Congress’s power to correct, and that 
no other governmental institution stands ready to rectify. In this circum-
stance, the proposition that Congress has a constitutional duty to act be-
comes dramatically more colorable. 
In other words, this is an instance where the whether question as regards 
state extraterritoriality—the question of whether Congress should enact legis-
lation making clear that states cannot extraterritorially regulate—is deter-
mined by the interaction of constitutional considerations (Congress’s substan-
tive view that ours is a federal union of Soft Pluralism) and  other govern-
mental institutions’ (states’ and courts’) acts and omissions. Unlike ordinary 
circumstances, where Congress’s legislative agenda is entirely determined by 
political considerations and fully within Congress’s discretion, the whether 
question regarding state extraterritoriality thus may depend upon constitu-
tional considerations that potentially can impose a duty on Congress to act.110 
The same conclusions emerge if Congress thinks our federal union al-
lows for Hard Pluralism. If so, then Utah and its followers have acted consist-
ently with Congress’s constitutional view. Must Congress do anything? Cer-
tainly not.111 What if, however, opponents of those state regulations con-
vinced a court to strike it down on Dormant Commerce Clause grounds? 
Such judicial action would preclude the sort of state regulation that Con-
gress believes to be constitutionally consistent with our federal union. Con-
gress has the power to counteract this wrongful abridgment of state powers, 
and is the only governmental institution that stands ready to do so. This is 
another instance where the whether question with respect to state extraterri-
                                                                                                                           
 110 To be clear, even if circumstances were such that the whether question was not answered 
by a constitutional duty to act, Congress would be free to act upon its own discretion. 
 111 Though there would be nothing wrongful were Congress to pass legislation that ratified 
and confirmed states’ extraterritorial powers. 
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toriality is informed by constitutional considerations that may lead to the 
conclusion that Congress has a constitutional duty to act.  
The analysis so far has considered the constitutional questions Con-
gress would face from two vantage points: if Congress believed our federal 
union required Soft Pluralism or permitted Hard Pluralism. There is, how-
ever, a third possibility: Congress may not yet have a view on the matter. 
There is nothing per se problematic with this final possibility, for Congress 
need not (and clearly does not) have a well-formulated view on all possible 
constitutional questions. Under certain circumstances, Congress never need 
adopt a position. This may be true, for example, if no states wanted to extra-
territorially regulate.112 After all, state inaction regarding extraterritoriality 
does not run afoul of any constitutional position concerning the nature of 
our federal union and the meaning of national and state citizenship. State 
inaction is consistent with Soft Pluralism, and does not violate Hard Plural-
ism, which does not require that states extraterritorially regulate. 
If states began to extraterritorially regulate, however, Congress at some 
point would be obligated to determine its constitutional view as to whether 
ours is a federal union of Soft or Hard Pluralism. This duty to formulate its 
constitutional position would not arise immediately upon the first state’s at-
tempt to regulate extraterritorially. Though Congress would have the power 
to act at that time, or even before any state has attempted to extraterritorial-
ly regulate, there would be nothing amiss for Congress to initially do noth-
ing, and to allow courts to be the first governmental institutions to consider 
whether states have extraterritorial powers. 
At some point after courts gave their answers, however, Congress has a 
duty to formulate its own view as to the constitutional question. This duty is 
a consequence of Congress’s ultimate powers regarding state extraterritori-
ality. Once the combination of state action and judicial decision has the ef-
fect of creating a federal union of either Soft or Hard Pluralism, it would be 
incumbent on Congress to decide whether it concurs with the decision, in 
which case it need do nothing further,113 or if it disagrees, in which case it 
would be obligated to act so as to correct what it understands to have been a 
mistake.  
At this point I have shown that the whether question regarding state 
extraterritoriality may be substantially determined by constitutional ques-
                                                                                                                           
 112 This is not the same thing as no state extraterritorially regulating. The statement above in 
text would not apply to a circumstance where states wanted to extraterritorially regulate their citi-
zens but did not because they believed they lacked the power to do so. See infra notes 138–140 
and accompanying text. 
 113 Though Congress could act by either affirming or modifying the regime that has come into 
existence. 
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tions. Of course the substance of Congress’s action—the what question re-
garding state extraterritoriality—also will be primarily determined not by 
mere political preferences, but by several constitutional considerations. The 
first is Congress’s view that our federal union, and derivatively what national 
and state citizenship entail, requires soft pluralism or allows for Hard Plural-
ism. And if Congress decided upon the latter, it also would have to take ac-
count of due process’s appropriate limits. Although due process provides the 
Home State significant berth to extraterritorially regulate its own citizens if 
their out-of-state action risks undermining the Home State’s policy, im-
portant unresolved questions remain regarding a state’s powers to extraterri-
torially regulate a non-citizen. 
The proposition that Congress could correct judicial decisions con-
cerning state extraterritoriality might seem puzzling in light of Marbury v. 
Madison. Yet this congressional power is wholly unproblematic, and indeed 
conventional, with respect to Dormant Commerce Clause decisions. Like-
wise, the Court has indicated that Congress can make alterations under its 
Effects Clause power to what the Court determines is demanded by the Full 
Faith and Credit Clause.114 Consistent with Congress’ power as regards 
Dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence and the judicial holdings con-
cerning the Full Faith and Credit Clause, Professor Metzger has forcefully 
argued that Congress can authorize state regulations that otherwise would 
violate the Privileges and Immunities Clause.115 
Congressional power to revise judicial rulings concerning state extra-
territoriality is a wise epistemic and political division of labor. Courts have 
well-catalogued institutional characteristics that permit deep dives in the 
normative domain that is constitutionalism.116 Deep and careful judicial 
analysis of concrete controversies can be expected to clarify the multiplicity 
of considerations that are in play. But it is to be expected that those multiple 
factors sometimes will point in divergent directions, with the result that 
some decisions will require a judgment as to how those competing factors 
are to be reconciled or traded-off. In regard to such circumstances, consid-
erations of democratic self-government and institutional synergy strongly 
support an institutional architecture in which the final decisionmakers are 
the more accountable political branches of government that can work with 
the normative clarifications generated by the judiciary’s preliminary forays. 
                                                                                                                           
 114 See Rosen, Hard or Soft Pluralism?, supra note 10, at 753. 
 115 See Metzger, supra note 18, at 1486–89. 
 116 See generally Mark D. Rosen & Christopher W. Schmidt, Why Broccoli? Limiting Princi-
ples and Popular Constitutionalism in the Health Care Case, 61 UCLA L. REV. 66 (2013) (ex-
plaining the benefits of allowing courts to be the initial institutions to consider constitutional ques-
tions, subject to legislative oversight). 
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It must be acknowledged that the outer bounds of Congress’s authority 
to revise judicial doctrines concerning state extraterritoriality are uncertain 
as a matter of black letter law. The Court’s discussion concerning Con-
gress’s revisionary powers under the Effects Clause was dicta, and the 
Court has never addressed Congress’s revisionary powers regarding the 
Privileges and Immunities Clause, the issue explored by Professor Metz-
ger.117 Further, the U.S. Supreme Court gave short shrift to Congress’s revi-
sionary powers when it addressed the Fourteenth Amendment’s national 
Citizenship Clause in Saenz v. Roe in 1999.118 
The absence of congressional revisionary authority regarding state ex-
traterritoriality, however, would give rise to a political architecture that cre-
ated surprising and unwise institutional incentives. As explained in Part I, 
Congress has substantial powers to regulate state extraterritoriality, proba-
bly most readily under its authority under the Effects Clause to determine 
the “Effect” that one state’s law has in a sister state.119 If Congress is with-
out power to revise judicial decisions as to what full faith and credit re-
quires, then congressional inaction risks ceding its constitutional powers. To 
avoid losing its prerogative to determine the scope of states’ extraterritorial 
powers, Congress would have to act before courts did. A “use-it-or-lose-it” 
architecture that encouraged Congress to race so as to be the first-mover is 
undesirable for many reasons. Chief among them is that such an incentive 
system puts at risk the beneficial epistemic division of labor just described,  
under which Congress can rely on the normative clarifications that emerge 
from the judiciary’s deep-dives when Congress makes the ultimate norma-
                                                                                                                           
 117 See Metzger, supra note 18, at 1493–98. 
 118 Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 499 (1999). At issue in that case was the constitutionality of a 
California law that limited certain welfare benefits that new California residents would receive for 
one year upon their arrival in California. After ruling that the state law violated the right to travel, 
the Court considered whether congressional approval of such durational requirements mattered. 
The Court thought the question was “readily answered, for we have consistently held that Con-
gress may not authorize the States to violate the Fourteenth Amendment. Moreover, the protection 
afforded to the citizen by the Citizenship Clause of that Amendment is a limitation on the powers 
of the National Government as well as the States.” Id. at 507–08. Neither of these unexceptional 
observations addresses, much less answers, Congress’s revisionary authority. After all, congres-
sional power to authoritatively determine what citizenship entails neither denies that the Citizen-
ship Clause limits the National Government nor presupposes that Congress can authorize the 
States to act unconstitutionally. Rather, revisionary authority goes to the question of which institu-
tion, Congress or the Court, has the final authority to determine what a particular constitutional 
provision (the Citizenship Clause) requires. Though it plausibly could be argued that the Court’s 
holding sub silentio assumed Congress did not have that power, it seems better to conclude that 
the Saenz Court simply did not consider, or answer, the question. 
 119 See supra notes 44–51 and accompanying text. 
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tive judgment as to how those judicially-clarified competing considerations 
should be reconciled or traded-off.120 
III. HOW THE SPECIAL NORMS SHOULD STRUCTURE CONGRESS’S 
DECISIONMAKING CONCERNING EXTRATERRITORIALITY  
As Parts I and II explained, the considerations that inform Congress’s 
determinations regarding state extraterritoriality are substantially, perhaps 
overwhelmingly, of constitutional dimension. Although congressional action 
always requires a threshold constitutional judgment that Congress has power 
to act, constitutional considerations are far more pervasive in the case of state 
extraterritoriality. This is because most of the time, once it has been decided 
that Congress has constitutional power to act, non-constitutional policy con-
siderations alone determine whether Congress should act and, if so, what it 
should do. With respect to state extraterritoriality, however, these whether 
and what determinations are substantially informed by constitutional con-
siderations. Furthermore, Congress’s power  to set the scope of state extra-
territoriality frequently, perhaps always, survives judicial decisions that ad-
dress the question.121 
Distinct from the descriptive claims advanced in Parts I and II, it is fair 
to inquire whether Congress’s constitutional decisionmaking responsibilities 
in relation to state extraterritoriality are cause for celebration or concern. 
The underlying question is whether Congress is institutionally capable of 
engaging in quality, responsible constitutional decisionmaking. There are 
many skeptics, and there indeed are real reasons for concern.122 Yet David 
Currie’s series of books The Constitution in Congress depicts a sustained 
era during which Congress appears to have engaged in serious and respon-
sible constitutional decisionmaking.123 Currie’s work helps us to avoid the 
fallacy of mistaking what is for what must be. 
                                                                                                                           
 120 See supra notes 116–118 and accompanying text. 
 121 See supra notes 112–118 and accompanying text. 
 122 See, e.g., Abner J. Mikva, How Well Does Congress Support and Defend the Constitu-
tion?, 61 N.C. L. REV. 587, 610 (1983) (stating that Congress “has not been a model of constitu-
tional decisionmaking” and that “[i]ts hallmark has been superficial and, for the most part, self-
serving constitutional debate”). 
 123 See generally DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN CONGRESS: DESCENT INTO THE 
MAELSTROM, 1829–1861 (2005) (the fourth entry in the series, examining constitutional events in 
the lead-up to the Civil War); DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN CONGRESS: DEMOCRATS 
AND WHIGS, 1829–1861 (2005) (the third entry in the series, examining Jacksonian revolution and 
the “American System” of economics); DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN CONGRESS: THE 
JEFFERSONIANS, 1801–1829 (2001) (examining the legal decisions of the Legislative and Execu-
tive branches from the Jefferson administration to the Jackson administration); DAVID P. CURRIE, 
THE CONSTITUTION IN CONGRESS: THE FEDERALIST PERIOD, 1789–1801 (1996) (providing a 
study of the legal decisions of the first six Congresses). 
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If Congress’s contemporary approach to constitutional decisionmaking 
indeed is less-than-satisfactory, one reason may be a pervasive view that 
constitutional judgments are the responsibility of other institutions.124 This 
perspective of course is mistaken, and there is no reason to think it is inca-
pable of correction.125  
Another contributing factor to Congress’s suboptimal constitutional 
decisionmaking may be a lacuna in institutional norms. A work-in-progress 
of mine argues that although there is nothing wrongful about Congress en-
gaging in virtually no-holds-barred Hardball Politics in the domain of ordi-
nary politics, constitutional decisionmaking is appropriately taken under a 
different set of norms.126 To provide an immensely compressed summary, 
the Special Norms appropriate to the constitutional domain are implicit in 
the best understanding of our practice of constitutionalism.127 The Special 
Norms encompass three norms that aim to facilitate the generation of re-
sponsible, Constitution-worthy decisions.128 The Special Norms encourage 
consensus, by means of compromise and persuasion, over brute force ma-
joritarianism in constitutional decisionmaking.129 And even where consen-
sus cannot be reached, the Special Norms place limits on the substantive 
positions that the majority can adopt.130 
Part III does not repeat the extensive case made in that work-in-
progress for the existence of Special Norms,131 but builds on it by providing 
a detailed exposition of how the Special Norms would operate in the specif-
ic context of state extraterritoriality. The Special Norms do not generate a 
unique solution, though they eliminate some options that would be available 
under Hardball Politics. More generally, the Special Norms aim to harness 
Congress’s unique institutional capacities that account for the value Con-
gress can, and should, add to the multi-institutional process by which our 
polity renders its constitutional judgments. As such, the Special Norms help 
counteract any anxiety that may accompany the recognition that Congress 
                                                                                                                           
 124 See, e.g., MARK TUSHNET, WEAK COURTS, STRONG RIGHTS: JUDICIAL REVIEW AND 
SOCIAL WELFARE RIGHTS IN COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 83–85 (2008). 
 125 A work-in-progress of mine provides a typology of the constitutional judgments Congress 
inevitably must render in connection with its multifarious activities. See Rosen, Special Norms 
Thesis, supra note 19, at 9–23. Parts I and II of this Article drew upon that typology when it 
showed the many constitutional judgments Congress must make in the specific context of state 
extraterritoriality. 
 126 See id. at 32–56. 
 127 See id. 
 128 See id. at 56–77. 
 129 See id. at 68–69, 74–75. 
 130 See id. 
 131 See id. at 32–56. 
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must make multiple constitutional decisions in relation to state extraterrito-
riality.  
Section A first discusses the Special Norm that I call Proactivity.132 
Section B applies the norm of Explicitness.133 And Section C explores the 
norm of Tempered Politics.134 
A. The Norm of Proactivity 
In the domain of ordinary politics, Congress is the master of its agen-
da. Such unfettered freedom, however, does not carry over to the constitu-
tional domain, where the Norm of Proactivity can impose a duty on Con-
gress to act.135 Sometimes circumstances conspire such that congressional 
action is a constitutional requirement. In that case, the norm of Proactivity 
incorporates, and is coincident with, a legal duty. But the norm of Proactivi-
ty can require action even where there is no constitutional duty, or even a 
sub-constitutional legal duty, for Congress to act. In other words, sometimes 
the norm of Proactivity may be a bare norm that does not incorporate a le-
gal obligation.136 One of the most important lessons of the norms literature 
is that bare norms are meaningful. Though norms frequently are embedded 
in positive law, norms can substantially guide behavior even when they are 
not incorporated into law.137 
This Article’s earlier discussion identified circumstances where the 
norm of Proactivity is coincident with a constitutional duty to act in respect 
of state extraterritoriality.138 For example, if courts upheld states’ extraterri-
torial regulations, and Congress believed we had a Soft Pluralist federal 
union, there would be a constitutional duty for Congress to act so as to pro-
tect our horizontal federal system.139 But the norm of Proactivity may ex-
tend further. Imagine if Congress believed our federal union permitted Hard 
Pluralism, and yet no states extraterritorially regulated their citizens. If 
Congress thought states were reluctant to regulate extraterritorially only 
because they were uncertain it was permissible, or that states did not realize 
that extraterritorial regulation was an option, the norm of Proactivity might 
                                                                                                                           
 132 See infra notes 135–141 and accompanying text. 
 133 See infra notes 142–143 and accompanying text. 
 134 See infra notes 144–204 and accompanying text. 
 135 See Rosen, Special Norms Thesis, supra note 19, at 57–58. 
 136 See id. at 24, 58. 
 137 See id. at 24–25. 
 138 See supra notes 112–113 and accompanying text. 
 139 See supra notes 112–113 and accompanying text (discussing Hard and Soft pluralism, and 
providing a hypothetical illustration of each). 
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require that Congress clarify states’ extraterritorial prerogatives.140 The 
norm of Proactivity may require congressional action even where there is 
no constitutional duty for Congress to act.141  
B. The Norm of Explicitness 
Where Congress confronts a constitutional question—whether it must 
on account of the norm of Proactivity, or because Congress discretionarily 
embarks on an activity with constitutional ingredients that necessitate a 
constitutional decision—the norm of Explicitness imposes a presumptive 
duty that Congress explicitly consider those constitutional questions.142 
That duty is defeasible only if Congress is incapable of responsibly render-
ing a particular constitutional decision, or if directly confronting the consti-
tutional question would be inconsistent with a specific institutional need or 
responsibility. If these conditions do not pertain, the norm of Explicitness 
requires that Congress forthrightly address the constitutional question.143 
It seems unlikely that either defeasibility condition would arise in rela-
tion to state extraterritoriality. As to the first, there is no reason to think 
Congress is incapable of deciding whether our federal union permits Hard 
Pluralism, or instead requires Soft Pluralism. To the contrary, Congress may 
be the institution most suited to rendering a constitutional decision such as 
this, which is so unguided by constitutional text yet so determinative of our 
nation’s basic political character. As to the second, it does not seem that de-
cisions concerning state extraterritoriality would arise in circumstances that 
required suspension of the norm of Explicitness. For instance, although the 
need for rapid decisionmaking conceivably could be a defeasibility condi-
tion, it is difficult to imagine any such need with respect to state extraterri-
toriality determinations. 
It follows that Congress’s constitutional decisionmaking in relation to 
state extraterritoriality likely would be subject to the norm of Explicitness. 
This means Congress would have to forthrightly confront the many consti-
tutional questions that arise in relation to state extraterritoriality, and decide 
them in accordance with the last of the Special Norms, the norm of Tem-
pered Politics. 
                                                                                                                           
 140 I do not take a firm position as to whether the norm of Proactivity would impose a duty in 
this circumstance. Fleshing out the norms’ specifics is a task best suited for Congress. See Rosen, 
Special Norms Thesis, supra note 19, at 63. 
 141 This is a circumstance where many components accounting for the answer to the what 
question (i.e., the substance of congressional action) would belong to the constitutional domain, 
though the considerations that answer the whether question did not. 
 142 See Rosen, Special Norms Thesis, supra note 19, at 61–63. 
 143 See id. 
2017] State Extraterritoriality and Congress 1041 
C. The Norm of Tempered Politics 
Tempered Politics comprises two sub-norms. The first, Reciprocity, is 
an internal self-disciplining constraint on the substantive positions each side 
is permitted to adopt.144 Constitutional decisionmakers only can espouse 
positions where they “think it at least reasonable for others to accept, as free 
and equal citizens, and not as dominated or manipulated, or under the pres-
sure of an inferior political or social position.”145 Reciprocity requires two 
things of constitutional decisionmakers. First, they must make two imagina-
tive leaps, putting themselves into the shoes of political opponents and then 
imagining themselves on the losing side of their own proposals.146 Second, 
constitutional decisionmakers must think holistically rather than narrowly.147 
Holism means that when asking themselves whether it is “at least reasonable” 
to expect that opponents could accept their substantive constitutional position, 
they must consider their positions’ implications for related contexts, not just 
the narrowest possible articulation of the question.148  
The second sub-norm, Communicative Exchange, imposes interactive 
requirements on disputants. Both sides must aim to “‘work[] out in commu-
nity what to do’” by communicating with each other.149 The sub-norm of 
Communicative Exchange thus disallows unilateral decisionmaking in con-
stitutional matters, even where the politically dominant side has disciplined 
                                                                                                                           
 144 See id. at 63–68 (discussing Reciprocity’s requirements); id. at 71–77 (explaining why the 
Special Norms include Reciprocity). 
 145 Id. at 65 (quoting JOHN RAWLS, THE LAW OF PEOPLES, WITH “THE IDEA OF PUBLIC REA-
SON REVISITED” 136–37 (2001)). By necessity, Reciprocity requires that a constitutional deci-
sionmaker reasonably think that the other side could accept his or her position, not that the other 
side in fact does. Interpreting Reciprocity the second way would transform it into a unanimity 
requirement, blocking too much constitutional decisionmaking. A related question in Reciproci-
ty’s application is how narrowly or broadly-sliced one’s opponents should be. The more thinly-
sliced, such that there are more opponent groups as to which Reciprocity’s “at least reasonable” 
requirement applies, the more unworkable Reciprocity becomes. Indeed, as the opposition is in-
creasingly narrowly-sliced, Reciprocity transforms into an unworkable unanimity requirement. As 
I have explained elsewhere, it would be up to Congress to determine over time how best to specify 
the Special Norms. See id. at 89. A plausible starting point might be to borrow the simplification 
upon which our two-party system relies by applying Reciprocity’s “at least reasonable” require-
ment to a single ideal typical opponent. 
 146 See id. at 66. 
 147 See id. at 66–67. 
 148 See id. at 68; see infra note 196 and accompanying text (discussing what does and does not 
count as related context); see also infra notes 163–181 and accompanying text (applying holism to 
state extraterritoriality). 
 149 Rosen, Special Norms Thesis, supra note 19, at at 68 (quoting ALLAN GIBBARD, WISE 
CHOICES, APT FEELINGS: A THEORY OF NORMATIVE JUDGMENT 72 (1990)). 
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itself by adopting a position that complies with Reciprocity.150 Communica-
tive Exchange requires that each side try to influence how the other thinks,151 
while also being open to being influenced. The sub-norm of Communicative 
Exchange also requires that all sides make a genuine effort to achieve con-
sensus through some combination of persuasion and compromise. Commu-
nicative Exchange thereby provides political minorities additional negotia-
tion leverage beyond what they have in the domain of ordinary politics.152 
Extraterritorial regulation of marijuana is a concrete context that al-
lows a full illustration of Reciprocity’s two requirements. 
1. Reciprocity 
First consider a congressman named Larry Libertarian. Larry is gener-
ally skeptical of governmental restrictions on people’s liberty, and is partic-
ularly repulsed by limits that cut into deeply personal decisions such as 
what people are allowed to ingest. Larry instinctually believes everyone 
should be able to use marijuana when they are in a state where its use is 
permitted. As a member of Congress, he is considering legislation that 
would so provide. 
Let us imagine, not too fancifully, that Larry believes that his instinc-
tual preference is in fact what the Constitution requires. He believes it 
would be unconstitutional for states to extraterritorially prohibit marijuana, 
or for Congress to license states to do so. The question explored here is 
whether Tempered Politics permits Larry to hold such a position, and if so 
what if any constraints Tempered Politics imposes. Notice that Tempered 
Politics applies only to Larry’s constitutional positions. There would be 
nothing improper about Larry concluding that Congress had constitutional 
power to authorize states to extraterritorially regulate, but that states should 
not be permitted to do so on policy grounds.153 The analysis that follows 
only concerns Congress’s constitutional decisionmaking, not its sub-
constitutional policy decisions.154 
                                                                                                                           
 150 To be sure, it is uncertain how fully Reciprocity can be realized without Communicative 
Exchange. Information directly from one’s political opponents sometimes may be necessary for 
Reciprocity’s imaginative leaps. 
 151 By eliciting this information, Communicative Exchange might aid the imaginative leaps 
that Reciprocity requires. 
 152 See Rosen, Special Norms Thesis, supra note 19, at 68. One side’s non-compliance with 
the Special Norms suspends the norm of Communicative Exchange, but not Reciprocity. See id. at 
88–92. 
 153 Unless such a restriction itself would violate the Constitution. 
 154 This is not to deny that some of the considerations raised during constitutional analysis 
may influence the parties’ policy analysis. 
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Tempered Politics’ first sub-norm, Reciprocity, requires Larry to step 
into his political opponent’s shoes by imagining things from her perspec-
tive.155 Let us begin by clarifying what perspectives his opponent may per-
missibly entertain. Whether marijuana may be used is a determination the 
federal government in effect has left to the states,156 allowing for state ex-
perimentation and perhaps even durable diversity.157 This means Larry’s 
opponent—call her Connie Communitarian—can support prohibition in her 
state because she thinks marijuana is physically dangerous, addictive, a 
gateway to more powerful drugs, or that its use is immoral or otherwise 
problematic. 
When complying with Reciprocity, Larry must ask whether it is rea-
sonable to believe that Connie would accept that citizens from her state are 
constitutionally entitled to use marijuana in a regulatorily permissive state. 
In so doing, Larry must imagine himself as holding Connie’s beliefs as to 
marijuana’s inherent dangerousness, addictive risk, gateway potential, or 
immorality. He must then recognize that his preferred extraterritoriality pol-
icy risks undermining each and every one of these policy concerns that may 
underwrite marijuana’s prohibition in Connie’s state. 
Reciprocity places the same demands, mutatis mundi, on Connie. Con-
nie’s instinctual preference is that it would be constitutional for Congress to 
authorize a Home State to extend its marijuana prohibition to its traveling 
citizens.158 Federal policy, however, allows states to permit marijuana use, 
thereby licensing Larry’s libertarian preference. In checking if her initial 
extraterritoriality preference is consistent with Reciprocity, Connie must 
imagine herself as a libertarian skeptical of government regulation, and ask 
                                                                                                                           
 155 Most of the time, it is best to start the Reciprocity analysis by first undertaking its imagina-
tive leaps before proceeding to holism. This is because the imaginative leaps readily rule out many 
options, as to which there accordingly is no need to analyze holistically. Sometimes, however, 
holism must be undertaken to adequately engage in the imaginative leaps. As explained below, 
this is the case regarding state extraterritoriality. See infra notes 169–181 and accompanying text. 
In these circumstances, the imaginative leaps are not fully independent of holism. 
 156 To be sure, this simplifies matters insofar as federal statutory law prohibits marijuana. See 
21 U.S.C. § 812 (2012). It is only because the federal executive branch has decided to essentially 
leave that law unenforced that regulation of marijuana has been ceded to the states. This does not, 
however, affect the discussion above in text, which assumes that Congress does not wish to coun-
termand the executive branch by re-establishing a uniform nationwide marijuana policy, but in-
stead addresses the horizontal federalism question of how to manage the states’ divergent regula-
tory approaches. 
 157 See supra notes 3–4 and accompanying text (discussing the current status of marijuana 
regulation federally and its state-by-state dynamic). 
 158 We need not be concerned with the constitutional question of whether states have such 
inherent powers even without congressional authorization because the discussion above in text is 
solely designed to illustrate how Tempered Politics would shape Congress’s constitutional deci-
sionmaking. 
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if such a person would think it at least reasonable that a state that prohibits 
marijuana has constitutional power to extend its restrictions extraterritorial-
ly. 
Sometimes, what Reciprocity’s imaginative leaps demand is very clear. 
When both sides analyze a policy’s costs roughly the same, then Reciproci-
ty’s imaginative leap generates easily identified solutions. Consider a pro-
posal that systematically encumbered supporters of only one political party 
from registering to vote. Because no side would want to be on the losing side 
of this proposal, Reciprocity unequivocally leads to its rejection.159 
But Reciprocity’s application becomes more complicated as the parties’ 
divergent perspectives lead each to analyze a policy’s benefits and costs dif-
ferently. The initial difficulty is the purely operational challenge of stepping 
into another’s conceptual and perceptual universe.160 Beyond this, it may 
seem that Reciprocity’s dictum that each side only espouse those positions 
that she “think[s] it at least reasonable for others to accept, as free and equal 
citizens, and not as dominated or manipulated, or under the pressure of an 
inferior political or social position,”161 may generate a null set. To illustrate, 
if Larry successfully puts himself in Connie’s shoes, would his preferred 
libertarian position pass Reciprocity? Perhaps not: why would Connie think 
it at least reasonable that citizens of her marijuana-prohibiting state can use 
marijuana when visiting marijuana-permitting states, given her views con-
cerning marijuana’s risks? Likewise, if Connie successfully puts herself in 
Larry’s shoes, would her preferred position pass Reciprocity? Once again 
the answer may appear to be no: why would Larry think it is at least reason-
able that citizens from Connie’s state cannot use marijuana during their 
travels, given his libertarian commitments? In short, the more Larry and 
Connie succeed in stepping into the other’s shoes, the more it seems possi-
ble that their opponent will not find their preference to be “at least reasona-
ble.” And if that occurs, the requirement of Reciprocity will yield a null set. 
Although a null set sometimes can arise,162 it would be premature to 
declare one with respect to state extraterritoriality at this point in our analy-
sis. To begin, the mere fact that neither Larry’s nor Connie’s initial pre-
ferred positions satisfies Reciprocity does not mean no Reciprocity-
compliant positions can be found. There might be other positions that do 
satisfy Reciprocity, and Reciprocity demands a search for such positions.  
                                                                                                                           
 159 See supra note 155 and accompanying text (explaining why Reciprocity analysis ordinari-
ly should begin with the interpretive leaps). 
 160 For a discussion of this challenge, as well as ways of meeting it, see Rosen, Special Norms 
Thesis, supra note 19, at 64–70. 
 161 Id. at 65 (quoting RAWLS, supra note 145, at 136–37). 
 162 I do not explore here what ought to be done in such a circumstance. 
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But is there some such middle ground option in respect of extraterrito-
rial state regulation of marijuana? I must confess that none comes to mind. 
It would seem that citizens from Connie’s prohibitory Home-State either are 
free to use marijuana in accordance with the laws of the state she is visiting 
(Larry’s preference), or they are not (Connie’s). 
Yet it still would be premature to declare a null set in relation to extra-
territorial marijuana regulations because the Reciprocity analysis undertak-
en so far is incomplete. Recall that in determining what positions satisfy 
Reciprocity, representatives must analyze state extraterritorial powers holis-
tically.163 They cannot think only of marijuana, but must consider related 
contexts where state extraterritoriality may arise, and make sure their con-
stitutional position regarding marijuana conforms with their views on state 
extraterritorial powers in these related contexts.164 There of course will be 
factual differences across these related, though not identical, contexts that 
potentially could justify varying extraterritoriality conclusions. But any dis-
tinctions would themselves have to comply with Reciprocity, meaning that 
the distinction’s proponent must think it at least reasonable that their politi-
cal opponent would agree that the distinction justifies a differential extrater-
ritorial rule across the two contexts. 
Gun rights is one such related context.165 Some states have laws that 
permit their citizens to carry concealed weapons. These laws reflect the 
view that citizens’ Second Amendment rights permit them to conceal carry, 
that citizens should be capable of protecting themselves if they are endan-
gered outside of their home, and more generally that citizens in a free socie-
ty should have this sort of freedom. All these policy interests can be under-
mined if a Home State’s traveling citizens cannot carry their concealed weap-
ons while out-of-state. For example, if citizens are unable to protect them-
selves when attacked out-of-state, their Home State will ultimately bear much 
of the costs that result from their injury or death. Accordingly, a Home State 
might want its citizens’ freedom to carry to operate while they are out of 
                                                                                                                           
 163 For a full explanation as to why, see Rosen, Special Norms Thesis, supra note 19, at 66–
68. 
 164 To reiterate, Reciprocity applies to the constitutional question of whether states have pow-
er to extraterritorially regulate, but not to the sub-constitutional policy question of whether (as-
suming such powers would not be unconstitutional) they should so regulate in a particular context. 
See id. at 11–13. 
 165 Gun rights is a particularly interesting example. A Home State typically is vulnerable to 
travel-evasion only if its law is more restrictive than the state to which its citizen might visit. For 
this reason, it might be expected that those with libertarian and rights-expansive proclivities would 
generally be averse to state extraterritorial powers. To the extent this is true, holism would not 
substantially enrich Reciprocity analysis as regards state extraterritoriality. As explained above in 
text, however, libertarians and rights-advocates may be inclined to support extraterritoriality in 
relation to gun rights. 
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state. Indeed, a recently introduced congressional bill would allow citizens 
with valid concealed carry licenses to carry their firearms in most other 
states.166 
Abortion is another related context. Some states have parental notifica-
tion requirements before a minor can obtain an abortion. Parental notifica-
tion statutes paternalistically protect the minor, and also guard the third par-
ty interests of the parents.167 Because both policy interests are undermined 
if the minor can get an abortion in a neighboring state without parental noti-
fication requirements, the minor’s Home State might want to extend its pa-
rental notification requirement to her when she is out of state. 
Reciprocity’s holism requirement disallows constitutional conclusions 
concerning extraterritoriality to be based on a representative’s substantive 
views of the particular subject of regulation.168 Reciprocity operationalizes 
the understanding that it would be wrongful for Larry to take the position 
that Congress lacks constitutional power to authorize states to extraterritori-
ally regulate marijuana because he objected to marijuana restrictions, and 
for Larry to then support the extraterritorial extension of concealed carry 
laws because he supported concealed carry. Likewise, Reciprocity means it 
would be wrongful for Connie to conclude that Congress had authority to 
authorize states to extend marijuana prohibitions extraterritorially, but to 
take the position that states cannot be authorized to apply parental notifica-
tion requirements to their out-of-state minors because she was pro-choice. 
Together, Reciprocity’s imaginative leaps and holism requirement aim 
to generate internally consistent constitutional positions.169 Consistency is 
designed to ensure that, as regards constitutional decisions, representatives 
do not adopt positions as to which they themselves would not be willing to 
be subject. Reciprocity’s requirement of consistency is fitting because the 
constitutional domain establishes the foundational entailments of citizen-
ship, and our democratic constitutional order is bottomed on a commitment 
to equal citizenship. A willingness to live in accordance with the founda-
tional rules that determine citizens’ political relations is a minimal condition 
for a polity of equal citizenship among inhabitants with  sharply divergent 
commitments. 
                                                                                                                           
 166 See Concealed Carry Reciprocity Act of 2017, H.R. 38, 115th Cong. (2017). The bill does 
not go as far as it possibly could, for it does not authorize concealed carry in states that prohibit 
the carrying of concealed firearms. 
 167 For now I shall put aside the possibility that such laws are an incremental measure to re-
duce abortions. 
 168 See Rosen, Special Norms Thesis, supra note 19, at 66–68. 
 169 See id. at 71–75. 
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So let us return to Larry and Connie. In considering whether Larry’s 
preferred constitutional position (that visiting citizens are constitutionally 
entitled to use marijuana when visiting a regulatorily permissive state) satis-
fies Reciprocity, we must take account of the fact that his preferred position 
has implications for gun regulation. If states cannot constitutionally extend 
their marijuana restrictions to their traveling citizens, then Reciprocity 
means that states likewise cannot extend their carry concealed carry permis-
sions to their out-of-state citizens, unless a Reciprocity-compliant distinc-
tion differentiates the two contexts. 
One of three  results can follow from Larry’s holistic analysis. First, Lar-
ry might accept Reciprocity’s implications that states cannot have extraterrito-
rial powers in the domain of gun rights.170 Pursuant to the oath he takes to 
uphold the Constitution, Larry would then be bound to act consistently with 
his constitutional conclusion in the future.171 This illustrates how Tempered 
Politics may restrict the constitutional positions a representative can put for-
ward. Second, Larry might abandon his preliminary position regarding mari-
juana, and instead concede that Congress has constitutional authority to au-
thorize states to extraterritorially regulate their citizens’ use of marijuana.172 
This is another illustration of Reciprocity’s operation so as to constrain the 
substantive constitutional positions a representative may espouse.  
Third, Larry might try to draw a distinction between marijuana and 
gun rights to support the conclusion that although states cannot be author-
ized to extraterritorially regulate marijuana, they can be allowed to extrater-
ritorially regulate concealed carry. I can conceive of two possible distinc-
tions, though in the end neither seems to be Reciprocity-compliant. First, it 
might be suggested that concealed carry laws are connected with a constitu-
tional right in a way that marijuana consumption is not. But this distinction 
is unable to satisfy Reciprocity. There is not at present a generally accepted 
constitutional right to carry a concealed weapon.173  Nor could the distinc-
tion be resuscitated by positing that Larry and his state compatriots think 
the Second Amendment properly encompasses a right to carry, even though 
present doctrine does not so provide, because supporters of marijuana de-
                                                                                                                           
 170 This would return us to the question posed in this Article as to whether Larry’s position 
complies with Reciprocity from the vantage point of the imaginative leap. 
 171 The statement above in text is not intended to foreclose good faith changes in constitution-
al views. 
 172 This formulation is designed to take no position on the question of whether states have 
such extraterritorial powers absent congressional authorization. 
 173 See, e.g., Peruta v. County of San Diego, 824 F.3d 919, 939 (9th Cir. 2016) (en banc) 
(holding that the Second Amendment does not guarantee a right to carry a concealed weapon).  
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regulation likewise might insist that its consumption ought to be constitu-
tionally protected (under privacy or liberty, for example).174   
As to the second possible distinction, Larry might suggest that states 
have extraterritorial powers to enhance, but not limit, liberty. On this view, 
there would be nothing inconsistent with Larry taking the position that 
Home States lack extraterritorial power to restrict citizens from using mari-
juana out-of-state but have extraterritorial powers to enhance their citizens’ 
liberty to carry concealed weapons. But this one-way ratchet would not pass 
Reciprocity because it is not reasonable to think Connie would accept it. 
First, insofar as she supports marijuana restrictions for paternalistic reasons, 
Connie may think that such prohibitions are ultimately liberty-enhancing. 
This would put extraterritorial marijuana limitations on level ground with 
extraterritorial licenses to concealed carry, undermining any purported dis-
tinction between them for purposes of extraterritoriality. Second, Connie 
might well reject the proposition that liberty enhancement is the sole criterion 
accounting for the scope of states’ extraterritorial powers. Connie believes 
there are multiple societal interests that are sufficiently important to justify 
regulation. For example, she might think that marijuana prohibitions protect 
the third-party interests of a would-be user’s family. If reasons apart from 
liberty-enhancement justify regulation, why should liberty-enhancement 
alone license extraterritoriality?  For these two reasons, it is not reasonable 
to assume Connie would accept the second distinction, meaning that it (too) 
is not Reciprocity-compliant. 
Because neither distinction is sufficient, Reciprocity requires Larry to 
have consistent views concerning states’ extraterritorial powers concerning 
both marijuana and concealed carry. And as explained above, there are two 
possible Reciprocity-compliant positions Larry might take:  that Congress 
has constitutional authority to authorize extraterritorial state regulations 
concerning both concealed carry and marijuana, or as to neither.  
This conclusion serves double duty. Most obviously, it identifies the 
restricted range of Reciprocity-compliant positions among which Larry may 
select. Second, Larry’s possible Reciprocity-complaint positions is an input 
into Connie’s Reciprocity analysis. After all, Reciprocity means Connie can 
adopt only those positions that Larry reasonably could be thought to sup-
port. So the conclusion that Larry might agree that states have extraterritori-
al regulatory powers in relation to marijuana (so long as he comes to the 
                                                                                                                           
 174 The statement above in text should not be construed as suggesting that states are without 
authority to act according to their independent constitutional understandings as to matters about 
which courts have not yet ruled, but only concerns the question of whether the proposed distinc-
tion is Reciprocity-compliant. 
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same conclusion as regards concealed carry) shows that Reciprocity does 
not disqualify Connie’s initial policy preference.  
Does this mean that Reciprocity does not generate a null set in the con-
text of state extraterritoriality after all?  To answer this, we must consider 
how Reciprocity’s holism requirement affects Connie. As was true with Lar-
ry, Connie’s initial preferred position must be squared with her views re-
garding state extraterritorial powers in related contexts. Reciprocity’s re-
quirement of consistency means Connie would have to concede that states 
also have power to apply parental notification requirements to traveling mi-
nors and concealed carry permissions to their out-of-state citizens, unless 
there are Reciprocity-compliant distinctions. 
I cannot think of a principled Reciprocity-compliant distinction that 
would justify extraterritoriality differences between marijuana restrictions 
and parental notification requirements. One conceivable difference is that 
abortion is connected to a constitutional right in a way marijuana use is 
not,175 but this seems unpersuasive for the reasons explained above in rela-
tion to Larry.176 Another possible distinction is the relative cost of the extra-
territorial restriction’s interference with liberty. On this approach, the con-
sequences of foregoing an abortion are immeasurably greater than those of 
foregoing marijuana.177 This distinction is problematic, however, because it 
ultimately is parasitic on the merits of the substantive regulation, and for 
that reason cannot satisfy Reciprocity. For example, supporters of parental 
notification requirements would disagree that the criterion of relative cost 
would decide against extraterritoriality, for they think a minor’s unguided 
out-of-state abortion decision profoundly undermines parental liberty and 
also the minor’s ultimate best interests. And it is not hard to imagine a mari-
juana advocate who believed that marijuana’s prohibition worked a pro-
found restriction on his liberty to fully self-actualize, or to better accept, and 
perhaps comprehend, reality. For this or many other readily imagined rea-
sons, marijuana restrictions might be counted as a very substantial interfer-
ence with liberty. This is why it is not possible to make Reciprocity-
compliant distinctions based on a comparative assessment of the degree to 
which a law enhances liberty. So if Connie wants to stick with the position 
that states can constitutionally be authorized to prohibit their citizens’ out-
                                                                                                                           
 175 As explained above, Connie’s political commitments would not permit her to assert Lar-
ry’s liberty-enhancement distinction. 
 176 Though both she and Larry might be inclined to accept the distinction, it is unacceptable 
because it is not principled for the reasons explained above in text. 
 177 This turns out to be virtually identical to Larry’s liberty-enhancing distinction insofar as its 
infirmities perfectly mirror what dooms the liberty-enhancing distinction. 
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of-state use of marijuana, she must concede that states also can regulate 
their traveling minors.  
There is, however, a principled Reciprocity-compliant distinction for 
treating concealed carry differently than marijuana. The scope of states’ ex-
traterritorial powers is an artifact of the nature of our federal union, more 
specifically whether we have a Soft or Hard Pluralist federal regime.178 
Connie’s view that states can extraterritorially apply marijuana prohibitions 
to their traveling citizens reflects a commitment to Hard Pluralism. Reci-
procity’s requirement of a consistent commitment to Hard Pluralism across 
all substantive policies does not translate into a conclusion that states al-
ways must have power to extraterritorially regulate. This is true because 
extraterritorial regulatory power can sometimes undermine Hard Pluralism. 
A consistent commitment to Hard Pluralism leads to the conclusion that 
states should not have extraterritorial powers in such circumstances. 
Concealed carry illustrates this point. For so long as there is no author-
itative determination that the Second Amendment encompasses the right to 
carry concealed weapons, states are free to regulate as they wish. This 
opens the door to diverse state policies, which in fact describes the status 
quo in the United States. State A can permit concealed carry for any of the 
reasons canvassed in this Part,179 and State B can refuse to permit concealed 
carry for a myriad of other reasons. For example, State B might believe that 
armed citizens create more dangers than benefits, or that concealed carry 
risks injecting fear among strangers that disrupts desirable social relations. 
If State A can license its citizens to carry in State B, such extraterritoriality 
would risk undermining State B’s capacity to realize its preferred policy’s 
expected benefits. It is in this respect that concealed carry is a context 
where extraterritorial powers can undermine, rather than support, Hard Plu-
ralism.180 For this reason, Hard Pluralism provides a principled distinction 
between extraterritorial regulations of marijuana and concealed carry. 
But Hard Pluralism can serve as a distinction between marijuana pro-
hibitions and parental notification laws, on the one hand, and concealed car-
ry, on the other, only if Hard Pluralism itself is Reciprocity-compliant. Is it 
at least reasonable to think Larry could accept Hard Pluralism? Yes. Though 
                                                                                                                           
 178 See supra notes 16–17 and accompanying text. 
 179 See supra notes 165–166 and accompanying text. 
 180 This simplifies the analysis, because the lack of extraterritorial powers may undermine a 
licensing states’ capacity to fully advance its policies. See supra notes 165–166 and accompanying 
text. The statement above in text presumes that extraterritoriality’s costs to a prohibitory state 
would exceed the costs a licensing state would experience without extraterritorial powers. This 
strikes me as a plausible position insofar as extraterritoriality would risk wholly undermining the 
prohibitory state’s policy, whereas the converse is not true. 
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Larry prefers a government that only lightly regulates its citizens, Connie 
could reasonably assume that Larry recognizes that not all citizens share his 
libertarian predilections. Our federal union guarantees that people like Larry 
can choose to live in a state that best mirrors his libertarian preferences, and 
Hard Pluralism maximizes each state’s capacity to secure its idiosyncratic 
political preferences while remaining part of a federal union. Though logic 
does not demand that all libertarians accept Hard Pluralism,181 it would be 
reasonable for Connie to think Larry could accept it. And that is all that is 
required to show that the Hard Pluralism distinction is Reciprocity-compliant. 
The upshot is that Reciprocity’s requirement of holistic analysis makes 
consistency demands on Connie’s constitutional positions (as it did with Lar-
ry). If Connie insists that states have constitutional power to prohibit their 
citizens’ extraterritorial use of marijuana, then she must accept that states 
have power to extraterritorially extend their parental notification requirements 
as well. Holism would not require that Connie also concede that states could 
be authorized to extraterritorially license their citizens to concealed carry, 
however, because Hard Pluralism provides a Reciprocity-compliant distinc-
tion.  
Although Connie’s preliminary position (that states can be authorized 
to extraterritorially prohibit their citizens’ use of marijuana) is Reciprocity-
complaint, holism may lead her to retreat from that original preference. She 
instead may conclude that states cannot be authorized by Congress to extra-
territorially regulate, on account of holism’s implications for parental notifi-
cation. This possibility has important implications for Larry’s Reciprocity 
analysis, for it means that his initial policy preference (that states cannot 
extraterritorially regulate their citizens) is Reciprocity-compliant. 
In the end, Reciprocity generates neither a null set nor a unique solu-
tion as regards state extraterritorial powers. There are several Reciprocity-
compliant positions available to both Larry and Connie, among which each 
can choose. Reciprocity is the start of a process where each party aims to 
                                                                                                                           
 181 “Proselytizing” libertarians who hope that all citizens will live under regulatorily minimal 
polities would prefer Soft Pluralism because it systematically undermines regulations that exceed 
the regulatory minimum of any single state. But other libertarians may prefer Hard Pluralism. For 
example, the influential libertarian theorist Robert Nozick has argued that people preferring great-
er regulation should move to a polity that reflects their preference. See, e.g., ROBERT NOZICK, 
ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 312 (1974) (defending a “framework for utopias” that permits 
citizens to opt in and out of the regulatory regime they prefer). Insofar as Hard Pluralism increases 
the range of regulatory options, a Nozickean might prefer it to Soft Pluralism. Moreover, Soft 
Pluralism can undermine libertarian preferences in some circumstances. For example, Soft Plural-
ism may undermine libertarianism if a neighboring state’s regulations fall short of the governmen-
tal protections a libertarian believes to be necessary. These reasons justify the conclusion above in 
text. For a preliminary discussion of how thinly or thickly to slice the opposition for purposes of 
Reciprocity analysis, see supra note 145. 
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step into its opposition’s shoes. In so doing, Reciprocity typically reduces 
the options that otherwise would be available under ordinary Hardball Poli-
tics, as state extraterritoriality illustrates. Those Reciprocity-compliant op-
tions are then the subjects of Tempered Politics’ second norm, Communica-
tive Exchange. 
2. Communicative Exchange 
Reciprocity initially operates as an internal self-disciplining norm with 
which each party is expected to comply in determining her preferred posi-
tion.182  This means Reciprocity can be fully satisfied by one side’s purely 
unilateral activities. Tempered Politics, however, does not believe that con-
stitutional decisionmaking should be unilateral, even if the political majori-
ty has a (Reciprocity-generated) enlightened position. Constitutional deci-
sions instead should be taken jointly, to the extent possible, owing to the 
nature of the constitutional domain in a modern heterogeneous democra-
cy.183 
Tempered Politics’ norm of Communicative Exchange is directed to 
satisfying constitutional decisionmaking’s interactive requirements. This is 
not to say that Commutative Exchange has no connection to Reciprocity. 
Communicative Exchange can augment each party’s capacity to step into 
the other’s shoes, furthering the process each party began on its own during 
Reciprocity. And the enhanced understanding of the other’s perspective that 
Communicative Exchange affords might refine each side’s understanding of 
what positions are Reciprocity-compliant. 
But Communicative Exchange does much more than facilitate Reciproc-
ity. Communicative Exchange also operationalizes a preference for deciding 
constitutional questions by means of consensus that is reached through some 
combination of persuasion and compromise (to the extent possible) rather 
than the brute force of majoritarianism politics. The preference for consensual 
decisionmaking in the domain of constitutionalism, which underwrites Com-
municative Exchange, is implicit in the best understanding of the practice of 
constitutionalism in large heterogeneous democracies.184 
To be sure, Tempered Politics does not guarantee a unique solution to 
each constitutional question. Tempered Politics understands that many, if 
not most, questions belonging to the constitutional domain are not suscepti-
ble to resolution through logic alone, but are necessarily decided through 
the messy, nonlinear political process through which most decisions con-
                                                                                                                           
 182 But see supra note 151 and accompanying text (discussing Reciprocity). 
 183 See Rosen, Special Norms Thesis, supra note 19, at 73–77. 
 184 See id. at 68–73. 
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cerning the polity’s social life are taken. But Tempered Politics insists that 
questions belonging to the constitutional domain are appropriately decided 
pursuant to a special type of politics—a tempered form of politics—that is a 
reflection of what sets the constitutional domain apart from the domain of 
ordinary politics. Tempered Politics aims to generate Constitution-worthy 
decisions that are suited to the constitutional domain. 
The norm of Communicative Exchange requires that each party aim-
to-influence the other as to the merits of its Reciprocity-compliant posi-
tion.185 Correspondingly, Communicative Exchange also requires that each 
party be open-to-being-influenced by the others’ arguments.186 Openness-to-
being-influenced does not unrealistically or unattractively assume a lack of 
commitment to one’s position. Rather, Communicative Exchange’s open-
ness-to-being influenced requirement reflects that what is at stake in consti-
tutional disputes is not the ultimate truth, concerning which open-minded 
flexibility is not necessarily hoped for, but the framework for determining 
social relations among a large group of politically-equal citizens with diver-
gent preferences. And as regards that, an  openness-to-being-influenced is 
proper and sensible. 
As each side aims to influence the other, Communicative Exchange al-
so imposes prima facie duties on the parties to compromise so as to reach a 
consensus. One promising template for compromise is for the parties to 
make trade-offs among Reciprocity-compliant positions. Reciprocity’s ho-
lism requirement can be expected to facilitate compromises of this sort. By 
requiring that the parties consider related issues when formulating their pre-
ferred position, holism facilitates the simultaneous consideration of these 
related issues during Communicative Exchange. The considering of related 
issues as the parties interact enables an airing of the intensity of each party’s 
preferences in respect of each issue. This can be expected to facilitate the 
identification of intelligible trade-offs that potentially can lead to consen-
sus.187 
In short, Communicative Exchange is designed to generate consensus 
solutions that emerge from some combination of persuasion and compro-
mise.188 Communicative Exchange’s preference for consensus, and the pri-
                                                                                                                           
 185 See id. at 70–73. 
 186 See id. at 69–70. Communicative Exchange’s requirements that each party aim-to-
influence the other while being open-to-being influenced together create what might be called a 
norm of Mutual Influence. 
 187 See id. at 75–76 (explaining this way, as well as the other ways that Tempered Politics can 
facilitate consensus). 
 188 To be sure, in practice it can be difficult to distinguish persuasion from compromise. This 
need not concern us because Communicative Exchange is concerned with consensus, and is indif-
ferent to the mixture of persuasion and compromise that accounts for it. 
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ma facie duties that preference generates, are artifacts of what constitution-
alism is in diverse modern democracies. It is the nature of what constitu-
tionalism is in such polities that makes consensus more important in the 
constitutional domain than in the domain of ordinary politics.189 
There are multiple ways constitutionalism’s consensus-aiming duties 
may be operationalized. One is the formal supermajority requirement for 
the production of new constitutional text.190 Communicative Exchange ad-
dresses post-production constitutional decisionmaking,191 and operational-
izes constitutionalism’s consensus-demands in a meaningfully different way 
than does a supermajority requirement.192 Among other differences, Com-
municative Exchange’s consensus-aiming duties are suspended if the other 
party does not comply with the Special Norms.193 Further, even when there 
is compliance, Tempered Politics permits post-production constitutional 
decisions to be made pursuant to majority decision when consensus cannot 
be reached.194 
Having clarified Communicative Exchange’s distinctiveness from su-
permajority requirements, it is worth reiterating that Tempered Politics’ ma-
jority decisionmaking is distinctive from Hardball Politics even when 
Communicative Exchange does not bring consensus. This is because Tem-
pered Politics requires that the policy that the political majority adopts 
complies with Reciprocity. Further, the political majority’s understanding of 
what is Reciprocity-compliant must be updated by any insights into its op-
position’s view that Communicative Exchange has afforded. 
As applied to state extraterritoriality, Communicative Exchange would 
require each party to make a genuine effort to convince the other of the 
merits of its Reciprocity-compliant position.195 On account of holism’s de-
                                                                                                                           
 189 See Rosen, Special Norms Thesis, supra note 19, at 73–77. 
 190 See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. V. 
 191 See Rosen, Special Norms Thesis, supra note 19, at 9–11 (distinguishing between the pro-
duction of constitutional text and post-production constitutional decisionmaking with that text). 
 192 See id. at 79. 
 193 See id. at 89–92. 
 194 This might be thought to invite gaming by the political majority, who could maximize 
their preferences by always refusing to compromise so that they can unilaterally select a reciproci-
ty-compliant position. Such action would not be consistent with what the norm of Tempered Poli-
tics requires. The check against such action is the fact that Tempered Politics is a norm. That is to 
say, the factors that account for the special norm of Tempered Politics can be expected to lead 
Congress to comply with the norm. For a full discussion, see id. at 31–32. To be sure, the risks of 
gaming are greatest before the norms have become entrenched. But this is true of all norms that 
are not embodied in positive law, and such norms nevertheless arise. Why?  Most likely on ac-
count of the social coordination benefits that the norms promise. See id. at 27–28. 
 195 Tempered Politics neither requires nor expects that this would be performed by each and 
every representative. It would be adequate for Communicative Exchange to occur in a suitably 
representative committee, though it may be wise, if not necessary, to allow input from non-
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mand to think beyond marijuana, Communicative Exchange would lead 
each party to consider more deeply for itself, and to discuss with the other, 
the relative merits of Soft and Hard Pluralism.196 The serious exchange that 
Communicative Exchange requires is strongly desirable. Whether our Con-
stitution permits Hard Pluralism or requires Soft Pluralism is a foundation-
ally important question that substantially informs the nature of our federal 
union. Because constitutional text does not answer the question, but instead 
allocates decisionmaking authority over it to Congress,197 surely it is bene-
ficial for Congress to undertake this decisionmaking in a serious way. And 
that is what Communicative Exchange aims to bring about. 
While the related contexts where state extraterritoriality questions arise 
are under consideration, Communicative Exchange imposes a duty198 on the 
parties to seek consensus concerning the constitutional questions through 
some combination of persuasion and compromise. This might appear para-
doxical. Holism demands that a party’s position be internally consistent, yet 
Communicative Exchange permits, and indeed encourages, trade-offs. Be-
cause trade-offs can result in outcomes that are not internally consistent, 
Communicative Exchange might be thought to be inconsistent with holism. 
But there is no paradox. Reciprocity’s insistence on internal consistency 
applies to a party’s pre-negotiation position, whereas Communicative Ex-
change concerns the ultimate constitutional outcome. Communicative Ex-
change’s preference for tradeoffs reflects the understanding that there is noth-
ing problematic about a constitutional outcome that reflects compromise that 
is in service of consensus.199 Given the various purposes that constitutions 
                                                                                                                           
committee members. In any event, this Article does not purport to exhaust the many important 
institutional design questions involved in institutionalizing Tempered Politics. 
 196 If the nod were given to Hard Pluralism, many additional constitutional questions would 
have to be addressed at some point, such as precisely when states have power to apply their laws 
to the out-of-state activities of non-citizens, and whether states have some constitutional duty to 
take steps to support the efficacy of sister states’ laws. See Bradford Elec. Light Co. v. Clapper, 
286 U.S. 145, 159 (1932) (requiring one state to apply another’s different law because “[i]f this 
were not so . . . the effectiveness of the [sister state’s] act would be gravely impaired”); Bernhard 
v. Harrah’s Club, 16 Cal. 3d 313, 323 (1976) (applying California law to Nevada innkeeper). 
These constitutional questions need not be addressed when Congress first considers the choice 
between Hard and Soft Pluralism. Reciprocity’s holism requirement would not demand their im-
mediate consideration because their resolution is independent of a determination that our federal 
union allows Hard Pluralism. For this reason, they qualify as follow-on constitutional questions, 
not “related contexts” for purposes of holism. See supra notes 146–148 and accompanying text. 
 197 See supra notes 23–104 and accompanying text (Part II, discussing Congress’s deci-
sionmaking authority). 
 198 Tempered Politics’ requirements are not judicially enforceable. See Rosen, Special Norms 
Thesis, supra note 19, at 25–26. 
 199 The possibility of mutual compromise in service of consensus does not undermine the 
importance of Reciprocity’s requirement of internal consistency with respect to each party’s initial 
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serve in a large diverse democracy, consistency in constitutional outcomes is 
not always desirable. Reflective of this, our written Constitution famously 
embodies many compromises among competing commitments.200 These 
compromises did not result in internally consistent outcomes, but generated 
either stable split-the-baby solutions or unresolved tensions that had to be 
worked out over time. This is not to suggest that  all compromises are norma-
tively defensible.201 To the contrary, there unquestionably are “rotten com-
promises” that never ought to be made.202 But rotten compromise is a very 
small category, primarily because compromise in setting the terms of social 
relations is such a powerful normative good.203 Just as compromise was cru-
cial to the production of our written Constitution, compromise can be ex-
pected to continue to be an essential part of  post-production constitutional 
decisionmaking.204 
CONCLUSION 
For so long as the federal government does not insist on a uniform na-
tionwide policy concerning marijuana, disparate state laws may lead some 
                                                                                                                           
positions. To the contrary, Reciprocity’s consistency requirement facilitates, and may be a pre-
condition for, the process of compromise. 
 200 This includes the Great Compromise of 1787, which led to our bicameral federal legisla-
ture, and the Madisonian compromise. See generally Henry Paul Monaghan, We the People[s], 
Original Understanding, and Constitutional Amendment, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 121, 121, 142–47 
(1996) (discussing the Great Compromise and “examin[ing] the tensions inherent in the ‘neither 
wholly national nor wholly federal’ constitutional order created in 1789”); Lumen N. Mulligan, 
Did the Madisonian Compromise Survive Detention at Guantanamo?, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 535, 
539–40 (2010) (explaining the Madisonian compromise). 
 201 Here I mean to include the compromises baked into our Constitution that allowed slavery 
to continue. See generally Jamal Greene, Originalism’s Race Problem, 88 DENV. U. L. REV. 517 
(2011) (considering the question, “[h]ow can any political document retain democratic authority 
across successive generations?” in the context of the Constitution’s “race problem”). 
 202 See AVISHAI MARGALIT, ON COMPROMISE, AND ROTTEN COMPROMISE 54 (2009) (defin-
ing rotten compromises, which must be categorically avoided, as any agreement that “establishes 
or maintains an inhuman political order based on systematic cruelty and humiliation as its perma-
nent features”). 
 203 See id. at 1–3 (arguing that compromise can be normatively justifiable even when the 
compromise comes at the cost of some justice); Rosen, Special Norms Thesis, supra note 19, at 
74–76 (discussing the many benefits of consensus in constitutional matters). 
 204 This is not to suggest that pre-Constitution and post-Constitution circumstances are identi-
cal. To the contrary, it is to be hoped that the deep social divisions that typically require a constitu-
tion’s drafters to paper-over sharp differences will yield to increasing social cohesion over time. 
See Cass R. Sunstein, Incompletely Theorized Agreements in Constitutional Law, 74 SOC. RES. 1, 
13–16 (2007). Yet the conditions that make it likely that sharp disputes among citizens in free 
societies will endure suggest that constitutional disagreements also will not disappear. See JOHN 
RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM xviii–xix (expanded ed. 2005) (discussing pluralism). As such, 
compromise can be expected to remain important in the domain of post-production constitutional 
decisionmaking. 
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states to consider extraterritorially regulating their citizens so as to fully 
realize their policy preferences. Although there is legitimate uncertainty as 
to whether states have the authority to take the initiative to regulate extrater-
ritorially, Congress unquestionably has the power under the Constitution to 
decide if and to what extent states can regulate extraterritorially. The deter-
minations of whether Congress should enact legislation clarifying the scope 
of states’ extraterritorial powers, and if so what the substance of that federal 
legislation should be, are substantially informed by constitutional consid-
erations. 
The fact that the whether and what questions concerning state extrater-
ritoriality largely belong to the domain of constitutional decisionmaking 
should affect the way Congress goes about resolving them. When engaged 
in constitutional decisionmaking, Congress should act in accordance with 
the Special Norms, instead of the minimal norms operative during ordinary 
politics that permit virtually no-holds-barred political warfare. The norm of 
Proactivity may require congressional action concerning state extraterritori-
ality, and the norm of Explicitness will demand that Congress explicitly ad-
dress the myriad constitutional questions that are implicated by state extra-
territoriality, whether Congress addresses extraterritoriality out of duty or 
discretionarily. 
And those constitutional questions should be decided in accordance 
with the norm of Tempered Politics. Tempered Politics comprises two sub-
norms. Reciprocity demands that parties take only those constitutional posi-
tions that they reasonably believe their opponents can accept, which re-
quires interpretive leaps in relation to a holistic consideration of the issues, 
thereby generating internally consistent constitutional positions. Tempered 
Politics’ sub-norm of Communicative Exchange places interactive demands 
on all sides that are aimed at facilitating a full airing of the constitutional 
issues. Communicative Exchange also imposes a prima facie duty on the 
parties to strive for consensus through some combination of persuasion and 
compromise, instead of the brute force majoritarian decisionmaking that is 
perfectly permissible in the domain of ordinary politics. 
Tempered Politics does not purport to generate a unique solution to 
constitutional questions. It does, however, eliminate some positions that 
otherwise could be live considerations under the norms of Hardball Politics, 
as it structures constitutional decisionmaking to both encourage and facili-
tate the production of Constitution-worthy decisions. 
  
 
